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INTRODUCTION
The goal of this text is to attempt identifying the signs that Russian soft power 
– which serves as the main instrument for promoting the ‘Russian World’ idea 
– is present in Belarus. The starting point was the change in the rhetoric of most 
Russian expert circles concerning Belarus which was observed from 2014 (in 
the context of the developments in Ukraine), when Belarus began to be viewed 
almost exclusively as an ally. Furthermore, this text contains an analysis of both 
the institutions and organisations which officially play the role of propagators 
of Russian culture, as well as entities which will not admit in public that they 
make efforts to strengthen Russian influence in Belarus. This paper also pre-
sents an evaluation of the Belarusian government’s reaction to the increasing 
presence of the ‘Russian World’. 
This report begins with a description of the critical narrative of Russian experts 
concerning Belarus and its government. It goes on to describe the presence and 
the operation of the propagators of the ‘Russian World’ in Belarus and the un-
clear policy adopted by Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s regime towards these threats. 
The last part of this text contains an attempt at a conclusion and an outline of 
possible ways in which the situation may develop. 
This report is the first to present Russian soft power in Belarus in such a com-
prehensive manner. This problem remains unnoticed by a majority of Western 
experts. Their perception is based on the well-established if not quite correct 
assumption that Belarus’s complete dependence on Russia is already defini-
tively prejudged foregone conclusion, and therefore that Russia does not even 
consider the risk that this country might break free of its zone of influence in 
the post-Soviet area. 
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THESES
1.	 The Russian narrative on Belarus changed in 2014 when the Russian govern-
ment elite essentially redefined its perception of its Belarusian ally, given 
the context of the conflict in Ukraine and the escalation of tensions between 
Moscow and the West. Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who was distancing him-
self from Russia’s aggressive Ukraine policy, finally stopped being viewed 
as the only and sufficient guarantor of keeping Belarus within the sphere 
of Russian influence. The decision-makers in Moscow came to the conclu-
sion that Belarus, which had been perceived for many years as a ‘brother 
republic’, was gradually transforming into a national state, emphasising its 
distinctness from Russia in many ways. 
2.	 Russia’s more critical approach to Belarus is based on the evaluation of real 
moves made by Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who has for many years been ma-
noeuvring between the East and the West in an attempt to maintain as much 
autonomy as possible. At the same time, the highly critical, and sometimes 
even emotional, argumentation of Russian experts betrays the tendency to 
exaggerate what are in fact cautious moves made by Belarus and which are 
incorrectly interpreted as an attempt to definitively leave the Russian zone 
of influence. The change in the Russian perspective was strongly affected 
by the developments in Ukraine, which made Moscow more distrustful of 
any signs of self-reliance demonstrated by the governments of those post-
Soviet republics which maintain friendly relations with Russia and which 
additionally are dependent on it in economic and energy terms. Until that 
moment, Belarus was presented as a model example of this kind of close 
relations. 
3.	 The conclusions of Russian experts and the symptoms of Belarus’s emanci-
pation were accompanied by a growing conviction among the Russian elite 
that Moscow has insufficient control over Minsk; the instruments of control 
being the energy sector (oil and gas supplies), trade (preferential access to 
the Russian market) and the military sector (close co-operation between the 
armies of the two countries). As a result, actions to create a genuine socio-
cultural soft power promoting ‘Russian World’ values, which had previously 
been undertaken on a very limited scale, were intensified. The first symptom 
of this process was the change in the narrative of Russian experts, including 
centres affiliated to the Russian government. Since 2014, an unprecedent-
edly large number of papers concerning Belarusian issues have been pub-
lished which suggest that Belarus, given its nationalism and anti-Russian 
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approach, is gradually embarking on the Ukrainian way, which may lead to 
confrontation with Russia in the future. The responsibility for this state of 
affairs is placed unequivocally on Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who for many 
years was presented as Russia’s closest ally in the post-Soviet area. Hence the 
conclusion that the image of the Belarusian president has clearly changed 
in the narrative of Russian experts. 
4.	 It needs to be emphasised that the Russian experts’ narrative, which is in-
creasingly critical of Belarus and its government, is not identical with the 
official stance adopted by the Kremlin, which is continuing its rhetoric of 
the co-operation of two allies and the ‘brotherhood of nations’. However, the 
Russian papers presented in this text are comprehensive enough to become 
at any moment part of the government’s propaganda justifying Russia tak-
ing strong measures with regard to Belarus. The fact that radical opinions 
evaluating the situation in Belarus are unrelated to the government’s official 
policy is thus only seemingly of marginal significance. 
5.	 The operation of Russian and pro-Russian organisations is another symptom 
of the increasing activity of Russian soft power in Belarus. The attempt to 
classify them presented in this text predominantly covers those entities 
which have been active for many years, which were established at the begin-
ning of this century and some in the 1990s. Few of them were established re-
cently, including already at the time of the Ukrainian crisis. However, given 
the context of the developments in Ukraine and the escalation of tensions in 
the region in general, their operation takes on a completely new character 
which is much more dangerous to Belarusian sovereignty and social stabil-
ity. Most of these entities have significantly intensified their activity over 
the past two years; this is a result of the stronger financial support offered 
using Russia’s public money via various channels which are often difficult to 
trace. And even though these are framework structures at present, it seems 
that, if needed, they would be able to increase the number of their members 
in a relatively short time and take action to support the Kremlin’s current 
interest in Belarus. 
6.	 The most important instruments for promoting the ‘Russian World’ include 
the Belarusian Orthodox Church (which is subordinate to the Moscow Patri-
archate) and the Russian media. According to the Belarusian government’s 
estimates, Russian production currently occupies as much as 65% of Belaru-
sian media space, and this means that the Russian media has huge possibili-
ties of influencing the mindset of ordinary citizens of Belarus. 
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7.	 Russia intends above all to bolster and then expand its influence in the Bela-
rusian politico-social space. Furthermore, its well-developed soft power is ex-
pected to pose a potential threat to the stability of Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s 
regime and thus serve as a guarantor of his loyalty to the Kremlin. At the same 
time, if Moscow becomes distrustful of Lukashenka, it may utilise the prepared 
‘Russian World’ infrastructure for a more or less radical interference in the in-
ternal situation in Belarus, including the replacement of the country’s leaders. 
8.	 The Belarusian repression apparatus, so experienced and effective in deal-
ing with the pro-democratic opposition financed by the West, is surprisingly 
passive with regard to the organisations propagating the ‘Russian World’. 
No event held by any of these entities has been banned or obstructed by the 
government. Members of these organisations, unlike activists of Belarusian 
democratic forces and the third sector, have not met with violence or arrests, 
let alone court trials. 
9.	 There are three reasons for the cautious policy adopted by the regime to-
wards the pro-Russian circles. Firstly, even though the Belarusian gov-
ernment understands the threat posed by the increasing presence of the 
‘Russian World’, it fears that a wave of repressions against pro-Russian 
organisations could drastically worsen relations with Russia, leading to 
aggressive moves. Secondly, the mechanisms, procedures and operational 
habits of the Belarusian security apparatus, which have been developed for 
years, fundamentally cover only the structures which are pro-European 
and pro-democratically oriented and financed by the West. Furthermore, 
the Belarusian government does not want and furthermore is objectively 
unable to strengthen the natural counterbalance to Russian soft power, i.e. 
the Belarusian right-wing and national organisations. This move in the re-
gime’s domestic policy would be too radical and difficult to control. Thirdly, 
the government in Minsk is uncertain about the loyalty of the elites. It seems 
that there are many factors which make it is extremely difficult to separate 
‘us’ from ‘them’: the long tradition of being part of a common state governed 
by Russia (the Russian Empire and then the USSR); the integration process 
of the two countries ongoing since the mid-1990s; strong bonds as politi-
cal allies (in the economic and military sense); and the cultural proximity 
(which is, however, far from indistinguishability). All this means that the 
Belarusian government does not yet have a complete strategy for counter-
acting the threat of the ‘Russian World’ expansion. Minsk still hopes that 
Russia’s official co-operation-oriented policy will remain unchanged, and at 
the same time downplays the risk that relations might deteriorate. 
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10.	The Belarusian public is not a serious barrier to Russian soft power, either. 
Most Belarusians do not perceive Russia or Russians as a threat. In turn, 
the fears of the consequences of a conflict between ‘great powers’ which are 
typical of the Belarusian mentality, may only strengthen pro-Russian senti-
ments, since Russia is still viewed as the only power capable of influencing 
the situation in the post-Soviet area. 
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I. THE baCkgROUND Of RUSSIaN-bElaRUSIaN 
CO-OpERaTION bEfORE THE ESCalaTION  
Of THE CONflICT IN UkRaINE
Due to its strategic location, Belarus has been one of the key objects in the Rus-
sian policy of rebuilding its influence in the post-Soviet area. One of the theses, 
which has been entrenched in Russian geopolitical thought for years, provides 
that control over Belarus is one of the top priority factors contributing to build-
ing Russia’s imperial status and that there is no other issue more important, 
except for maintaining influence in Ukraine1. This is why the (re)integration of 
independent Belarus (it gained independence on 25 August 1991) with the Rus-
sian Federation began just years after the collapse of the USSR. The signing of 
the Treaty on the Commonwealth of Belarus and Russia marked the beginning 
of the process. The commonwealth was later transformed into the Union of Bela-
rus and Russia to take the form of the Union State of Belarus and Russia in 1999. 
Russia viewed this as a paradigm of how to regain its assets in the post-Soviet 
area which had been lost after the collapse of the USSR, and it was ready to use it 
also with regard to other states. In terms of defence, integration with Belarus of-
fered Russia a natural shield on the so-called ‘western flank’, i.e. on the frontier 
with a few NATO member states: Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. Furthermore, 
for Moscow co-operation with Minsk means the only way to keep close2 to Ka-
liningrad Oblast, an area of strategic military significance. In addition to this, 
the Yamal gas pipeline and the Druzhba oil pipeline, which are essential parts of 
the Russian system of oil and gas supplies to European customers, run through 
Belarus. Considering these factors, the Kremlin has since the mid-1990s been 
determined to maintain and at the same time expand its influence in Belarus, 
even at the expense of very costly economic and energy subsidies. According 
to estimates from Belarusian and Russian experts, the	total	value	of	Russian	
support	(in	the	form	of	both	loans	and	reduced	oil	and	gas	prices)	at	times	
even	exceeded	US$10	billion	annually.	
In turn, President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who has ruled Belarus uninterrupt-
edly since 1994, viewed close political and economic co-operation with Russia 
as a guarantee for him to remain in power since, in exchange for participation 
in integration, he could expect economic and financial preferences, including 
1 See: Konrad Świder, Rosyjska świadomość geopolityczna a Ukraina i Białoruś, Institute of Po-
litical Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw 2015, pp. 121, 159-161, 180.
2 However, Belarus does not border directly on the oblast, so the transit route from Russia to 
Kaliningrad runs through Lithuania. 
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facilitated access for Belarusian producers to the Russian market, stabilisation 
loans and a number of other economic subsidies. Minsk also saw Moscow’s po-
litical support on the international arena as being very important, especially 
when the West imposed visa and economic sanctions on Belarus, accusing the 
Belarusian government of violating human rights and democratic rules. Minsk 
and Moscow would occasionally enter into dispute due to different interpreta-
tions of their obligations as allies3, and this was accompanied by mutual ac-
cusations, and sometimes even critical information campaigns. However, such 
crises have been short-lived. Importantly, the basic paradigm that both parties 
strive for integration and closer co-operation in the areas of politics and defence 
was not undermined at any time. What is also essential for the issue under dis-
cussion is the fact that the thesis that Alyaksandr Lukashenka is loyal to Russia 
as the sole strategic ally was not explicitly questioned even once. Criticism from 
the Kremlin and the expert and journalist circles closely co-operating with it 
was moderate even in the case of the most prestigious issues, when it turned out 
that Minsk did not intend to unconditionally support the Kremlin’s expansive 
policy in the post-Soviet area4. 
The Russian narrative with regard to Belarus changed in 2014, when the	Rus-
sian	government	elite	essentially	redefined	their	perception	of	their	Bela-
rusian	ally	in the context of the conflict in Ukraine and the escalation of ten-
sions between Moscow and the West. Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who distanced 
himself from Moscow’s aggressive policy towards Kyiv, ultimately ceased to 
be considered the sole and sufficient guarantor of Belarus remaining within 
the sphere of Russian influence. The intensification of actions aimed at build-
ing genuine soft power, promoting ‘Russian World’ values in the neighbouring 
republic, which had previously been conducted on a very limited scale, was 
a logical consequence of this conclusion. 
3 Over the past two decades, Russian-Belarusian relations have been characterised by nu-
merous disputes, above all over the sale of key Belarusian industrial assets to Russian in-
vestors. Other problematic issues included the reduced prices of oil and gas supplied from 
Russia and access to the Russian market for Belarusian food and machine industry produc-
tion. Minsk’s dialogue with the West has also been a trouble spot in bilateral relations, as in 
2010, when Russia attempted to block what it saw as an overly advanced process of build-
ing closer relations with the EU by launching an information campaign against President 
Lukashenka. The attacks in the media softened after the Belarusian government joined in 
the deal on the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union in December 2010. 
4 In 2008, Belarus did not follow Russia in its recognition of the independence of Abkhazia 
and Southern Ossetia. Despite pressure from Russia, Minsk did not change its stance and 
at the same time was consistently developing co-operation with Georgia, regardless of the 
periodical tension between Moscow and Tbilisi. 
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II. THE CHaNgE Of THE RUSSIaN ExpERT NaRRaTIvE 
ON bElaRUS
1. Russian experts are increasingly concerned about the possible 
emancipation of belarus 
As the conflict in Ukraine began, Russian policy in Eastern Europe for the first 
time took on a genuinely expansive and aggressive dimension. Such a clear in-
terference with Ukraine’s territorial integrity (although no declaration of war 
was every made), has given rise to serious concern in Belarus, where a gov-
ernment elite has been formed who are used to functioning within their own 
independent state. Alyaksandr Lukashenka began to feel threatened regardless 
of the great cultural proximity between Russia and Belarus, the long tradition 
of functioning as part of a single state and, above all, the well-developed politi-
cal and economic co-operation on many levels. A precedence has been set that 
theoretically opens up the possibility for questioning the borders of all other 
post-Soviet republics. Therefore, the Belarusian president, wanting to maintain 
independence and the prerogatives of power, did not clearly back the Russian 
moves in Ukraine and refrained from using strong rhetoric with regard to the 
new government in Kyiv5. At the same time, he offered mediation services in 
order to add legitimacy to himself in the eyes of the West, which is looking for 
a peaceful solution. 
In the context of the confrontation with Ukraine and the Western support given 
to the Ukrainian government, the annexation of Crimea and the military en-
gagement in the Donbas, the Kremlin expected unequivocal support from its 
allies in the post-Soviet area, above all from Belarus, its immediate neighbour. 
In a situation of increased tension in the region and the mobilisation of forces, 
even the cautious and very ambiguous stance adopted by Minsk6 could provoke 
5 Alyaksandr Lukashenka has made numerous statements concerning the situation in 
Ukraine, emphasising Belarus’s friendly and peaceful attitude to its southern neighbour. 
It is worth noting the statement he made on 7 June 2014 (soon after Petro Poroshenko was 
sworn in as the Ukrainian president) in which he clearly said “we do not intend to amass 
any NATO, Polish, Russian or Belarusian troops on our frontier. We do not fight against 
Ukraine, our border with them is a strip of good neighbourhood”; http://naviny.by/rubrics/
politic/2014/06/07/ic_news_112_43 7211/
6 While maintaining good relations with Kyiv, Lukashenka was trying to avoid open criti-
cism of Russian moves. The statement he made on 23 March 2014 in which he on the one 
hand announced that “Ukraine should be an integral and indivisible state” and on the other 
said that Crimea was in fact part of Russian territory, is a typical example of such rhetorical 
acrobatics; http://naviny.by/rubrics/politic /2014 /03/23/ic_articles_112_184995/ 
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serious concern in Moscow that Belarus could emancipate itself which, in the 
best-case scenario would mean a significant weakening of Russian influence in 
the country and, in the worst case, another military conflict on Russia’s western 
frontier. It needs to be emphasised that these concerns have not yet been re-
sulted in a change of the Russian government’s official rhetoric or in a noticeable 
reduction of meetings as part of the various formats of inter-state co-operation. 
If the analysis of Russian-Belarusian relations were limited only to the formal 
aspect of co-operation, one could even claim that Russia still views Belarus as 
a model ally which is loyally fulfilling its obligations as an ally in the areas of 
defence and politics7. 
However, a	 clear	 intensification	of	 criticism	aimed	at	Alyaksandr	Lu-
kashenka	and independent national circles who are in opposition to him has 
been observed since 2014 on the level of the Russian expert narrative (among 
both so-called independent analysts and commentators and those employed 
by governmental analytical centres or those linked to the government). Both	
the	quantity	and	the	content	of	critical	publications	are	unprecedented	
in	the	more	than	25	years	of	relations	between	Russia	and	independent	
Belarus.	Some	of	the	issues	raised	in	the	publications	have	never	before	
been	present	in	the	discourse	concerning	Belarus,	or	at	least	have	not	been	
presented	as	explicitly	as	now.	However, most importantly, even though these 
materials have been developed by mutually unrelated individuals or institu-
tions, given the significant similarity of their subject matter and style, it may 
be assumed that most of them have been inspired and/or coordinated by a single 
decision-making centre linked to the Russian government. It is worth noting 
that the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies	(RISI), a think tank working 
for the Russian Presidential Administration8, plays a major role in criticising 
7 Close Russian-Belarusian co-operation includes regular meetings by representatives of the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs of both countries (these are usually meetings of senior offi-
cials) intended at coordinating action on the international arena and developing a common 
stance on current regional and global issues. These meetings are often held on the level of 
ministers, for example, on 16 May 2016 in Minsk, when Sergei Lavrov and Uladzimir Makei 
issued a joint statement concerning such issues as Syria and the NATO presence in Central 
Europe. In addition to the real dimension of diplomatic consultations, these meetings are 
intended to demonstrate that the two countries conduct a common foreign policy. 
8 RISI was established in 1992 and has the status of a national academic institution, currently 
affiliated to the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation. Since 2009 it 
has been led by General Leonid Reshetnikov, who had long served for the Foreign Intelli-
gence Service of the Russian Federation (Russian SVR), and previously for the Soviet KGB. 
The institute has the reputation of being one of the Russian government’s key advisory and 
analytical centres. According to a former academic worker of this institution, Aleksandr 
Sytin, RISI for many years was subordinate to the SVR and carried out tasks for the intel-
14
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Minsk. Theses suggesting Russian disappointment with Belarus have been put 
forward on numerous occasions during the conferences held by this institu-
tion in Moscow. One example is the Belarusian dialogue debate that took place 
on 26 January 2016 with the participation of Russian and Belarusian experts. 
Oleg Nemensky, an RISI expert who was the moderator of the debate (he deals 
with the Belarusian topic, among other issues) stated clearly that, “in	the	end,	
we	have	been	unable	to	find	a	proper	model	of	integration	with	Belarus,	
and	we	are	unable	to	move	any	further	with	what	we	have	now	(…)	this	
is	mainly	an	effect	of	the	lack	of	interest	from	the	Belarusian	govern-
ment”.	Then	he	admitted	that	“the	Belarusian	government	long	ago	lost	
the	Belarusian	youth’s	support.	The	West	has	been	successfully	working	
with	them	for	years,	unlike	Russia,	which	has	regretted	neglecting	this	
issue.”	However, he concluded that the main problem was “the	war	waged	by	
Alyaksandr	Lukashenka	on	the	‘Russian	World’,	which	has	become	one	of	
the	main	tasks	of	the	Belarusian	state	apparatus.”9
Similar statements suggesting that Minsk has allegedly swapped the policy of 
‘brotherly integration’ for ‘Belarusian, anti-Russian nationalism’ can also be 
heard in official materials of RISI TV, i.e. the TV interviews with Oleg Nemensky 
available on the institute’s website10. The catalogue of accusations against the 
Belarusian government was further expanded by another think tank associ-
ated with the Kremlin, the Institute for CIS Countries Studies, led by a Russian 
politician and a member of the State Duma, Konstantin Zatulin11. The statements 
of Aleksandr Fadeyev (who has headed the Belarusian Department for many 
years) published in an article on 29 January 2015 are an excellent illustration of 
the institute’s stance on Belarus. Fadeyev openly expressed his concern with the 
ligence, and began serving the presidential administration only after 2009. According to 
Sytin, the structure then underwent a major staff reshuffle, and supporters of rebuilding 
Russia’s imperial power gained major influence on the directions of its work. For more, see: 
http://www.dal.by/news/1/15-01-15-6/ 
9 See: http://euroradio.by/ru/rossiyskiy-ekspert-belarus-ne-zainteresovana-v-dalneyshey-
integracii-s-rossiey 
10 See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=foBdaJFm6HY, https://www.youtube.com/wat 
ch ? v =dwKAUnafwh4 
11 The Institute for CIS Countries Studies was established in 1996 formally as an ‘autonomous 
non-commercial institution’ (this is quoted from the official website www.materik.ru). 
However, its founders include such institutions as: the government of Moscow, the Moscow 
State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO, linked to the Russian Ministry of For-
eign Affairs), Moscow State University, and the Russian Academy of Sciences. The institute 
specialises in analysing the situation of Russian diasporas living in former Soviet repub-
lics. The institute has on many occasions resorted in its rhetoric to arguments for recon-
structing Russian influence on the post-Soviet area. 
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fact that “Belarusians	are	persuaded	by	Alyaksandr	Lukashenka’s	regime	
(and	this	is	supported	by	‘pro-Western	organisations’)	to	accept	the	nation-
al	idea	which	puts	the	Belarusian	language,	culture	and	literature	in	the	
first	place.”	In his opinion, this leads to, “discriminating	against	the	Russian	
language	and	culture	in	the	country’s	everyday	life,	and	this	is	already	
a	serious	breach	of	the	Constitution	of	the	Republic	of	Belarus,	which	the	
Belarusian	government	intentionally	turns	a	blind	eye	to.”	Then he accused 
the Belarusian national media of “intentionally omitting or misrepresenting 
part of the news concerning the developments in eastern Ukraine”, which was 
coupled with “Lukashenka’s playing the role of a friend of the Ukrainian presi-
dent Petro Poroshenko, supporting Ukrainian independence and his intentional 
refusal to accept the annexation of Crimea.” This	policy,	along	with	tolerating	
radical	anti-Russian	groups	in	Belarus,	may,	in	Fadeyev’s	opinion,	lead	to	
the	Ukrainian	scenario	being	repeated	in	Belarus12.	It needs to be recognised 
that, when compared to RISI, the Institute for CIS Countries Studies goes much 
further in its critical evaluations of Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s policy and the 
forecasts formulated on the basis of these evaluations—this may be an effect of 
the fact that it is formally less directly affiliated to the Russian government. The 
team in charge of analysing the situation in Belarus do not restrict themselves to 
presenting expert opinions—they also publish materials which have the char-
acter of political statements, such as the text published on the institute’s website 
on 12 May 2016 in which the Belarusian government was severely criticised for 
using a ribbon in the Belarusian national colours (green and red) instead of 
the ‘ribbon of Saint George’ (which in Russia is a manifestation of support for 
the government and its version of history) during the celebrations of Victory 
Day on 9 May. In the opinion of the authors of the text this was an expression 
of “solidarity with the present regime in Kyiv”13. 
The views of the experts from the two think tanks linked to the Kremlin pre-
sented above have an influence on its foreign policy and are not the experts’ pri-
vate beliefs but rather an expression of the redefined perception of Belarus and, 
above all, of Alyaksandr Lukashenka, among the Russian government elite. The	
publication	of	an	extensive	paper	titled	Belarusian nationalism against the 
Russian World (Russian:	Belorusskiy natsionalizm protiv russkogo mira)14	
12 For more information see: http://www.materik.ru/rubric/detail.php?ID=19384 
13 For more information see: http://ross-bel.ru/about/news_post/vlasti-respubliki-belarus-
protiv-georgiyevskoy-lenty-i-bessmertnogo-polka 
14 The complete text in PDF format is available, for example, at this address: http://www.pub-
licdiplomacy.su/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Belorussia_obrez_123_200.pdf 
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last	autumn	was	an	important	addition	to	the	picture	of	Moscow’s	present	
views	on	its	Belarusian	ally. The book was published under the auspices of 
CIS-EMO (a Russian organisation known for watching elections in CIS coun-
tries) as part of a research project entitled Monitoring radical nationalism in the 
post-Soviet area. The publication was financed with a grant offered by a govern-
mental fund via the National Charity Fund (www.nbfond.ru) as part of a com-
petition held by decree of the president of the Russian Federation no. 243 of 25 
July 2014. It is worth emphasising that a number of publications concerning 
Ukraine have been financed in the same manner, such as: The influence of the 
Ukrainian crisis on extremist movements in Russia; Extremism in Ukrainian politics, 
society, media and law enforcement structures; Extremist movements in Russia versus 
the Ukrainian crisis, etc.15 
The book was written by Kirill Averyanov-Minsky, a Belarusian publicist and 
political analyst, and Vladislav Maltsev, a Russian journalist from Nezavisima-
ya Gazeta16. There	has	not	previously	been	such	an	extensive	publication	
which	describes	real	and	imagined	nationalism	in	Belarus	in	both	the	
country’s	government’s	policy	and	the	operation	of	selected	social	groups	
and	non-governmental	organisations.	Given	the	in-depth	analysis	and	the	
vast	scope	of	the	topics	raised,	the	book	needs	to	be	viewed	as	a	compre-
hensive	attempt	to	present	Russian	analytical	thought	with	the	attitude	
Belarus	takes	to	the	Russian	civilisational	offer	popularly	labelled	as	the	
‘Russian	World’.	The work is also – and this is essential – an attempt to identify 
those groups which obstruct or might obstruct the final inclusion of Belarus into 
the sphere of Russian political and cultural influence. 
key theses of the Russian publication Belarusian nationalism against 
the Russian World 
• The crisis in Ukraine marked an essential change in the perception of 
Belarus in Russia. The fact that Minsk did not unequivocally support the 
15 These publications are available at the website of CIS-EMO: www.cis-emo.net 
16 Averyanov was born in Belarus (most likely in Minsk; hence the penname Minsky added 
as the second part of his surname). He graduated from law school. At the end of 2014, his 
Belarusian citizenship was revoked, and a ban on entering Belarus was imposed on him. 
At present, he lives in Moscow and publishes numerous articles criticising Alyaksandr Lu-
kashenka’s policy towards Russia. Considering the incomparably larger number of publica-
tions on portals promoting the ‘Russian World’ idea and his better knowledge of Belarus, 
it seems to be that Averyanov was the main author of this book, while Maltsev played an 
auxiliary role. 
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annexation of Crimea and the proclamation of the Donetsk and Luhansk 
People’s Republics, as along with Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s clearly pro-
Ukrainian rhetoric came as a serious alarm signal to the Russian elite 
and public. This	was	because	it	became	ultimately	clear	that	Bela-
rus,	which	had	been	viewed	for	many	years	as	a	‘brother	republic’,	
was	gradually	transforming	into	what	was	increasingly	reminis-
cent	of	a	national	state	emphasising	its	distinctness	from	Russia	in	
many	ways.	Most	importantly,	the	Belarusian	government	has	not	
merely	granted	its	consent	to	these	processes	but	has	actively	par-
ticipated	in	them.	
• Belarusian independence which has for years been consistently built up 
by Alyaksandr Lukashenka presumes the weakening of its bonds with 
Russia. The idea of Belarusian independence includes the confrontation 
of two opposing notions: the ‘free European Belarus’ and the ‘Asian im-
perial Russia’. As	a	result,	only	a	full	implementation	of	the	Union	
State	project	tantamount	to	the	‘incorporation’	of	Belarus	into	the	
Russian	political	space	may	reverse	the	increasing	intensification	
of	sentiments	among	the	Belarusian	elite	and	public,	and	thus	will	
prevent	the	catastrophe	of	a	loss	of	influence	in	this	country.	
• Provincial nationalism’17, which was activated especially strongly in 
2014, and thus in the context of the developments in Ukraine, is an im-
portant element of the idea of Belarusian independence. The	govern-
ment	is	so	determined	to	strengthen	the	‘anti-Russian’	vector	that	
a	kind	of	(unwritten)	alliance	of	the	authoritarian	regime	and	the	
nationalist-right-wing	section	of	the	opposition	forces	(e.g.	the	Be-
larusian	People’s	Front)	and	media	(the	nationalist-oriented	week-
ly	Nasha Niva)	has	been	forged.	What unites the two camps is the ‘com-
mon enemy’, i.e. Russia and any entities representing its interests and 
point of view. 
• 	One consequence of this reorientation of the Belarusian government to-
wards anti-Russian sovereignty has been the reconstruction of the of-
ficial Belarusian historiography which now draws upon the traditions 
of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, presented as the main origin of the 
17 The literal translation of the Russian term mestechkovy natsionalizm is ‘small-town nation-
alism’, which has an even more pejorative meaning and suggests that Belarusians are un-
able to develop their own comprehensive and mature national idea. 
18
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 1
1/
20
16
Belarusian statehood, distinct from the Russian legal-political culture. 
Furthermore, the government more or less officially supports the pro-
motion of new Belarusian national heroes, who were engaged in evi-
dently anti-Russian activity, such as Konstanty Kalinowski, a leader of 
the January Uprising in the territories now located in Belarus18. The Bat-
tle of Orsha in 1514, which ended in the victory of the troops of the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania over the army of the Grand Duchy of Moscow, has 
become a symbol of Belarusian military triumph. More and more atten-
tion is being paid in academic publications and school and university 
textbooks to the Belarusian People’s Republic set up in 1918, which has 
also become one of the symbols of Belarusian independence. Further-
more, the post-war period, when Belarus was part of the USSR as one of 
the Soviet republics, is presented in more critical terms. Generally,	the	
goal	of	most	Belarusian	historians	is	to	create	and	entrench	a	nega-
tive	image	of	Russia	as	the	source	of	all	evil	and	catastrophes	in	Be-
larusian	history.	
• As a result of the increasingly negative perception of Russia presented 
in the Belarusian historical narrative, problems with monuments refer-
ring to the shared past of the two nations within one state have been 
observed over the past few years – something which had not previously 
been an issue in Belarus. One example of this phenomenon is the fact 
that the government of Minsk have twice rejected a motion brought by 
pro-Russian intelligentsia circles to return the monument to Tsar Al-
exander II which had been in the centre of the Belarusian capital and 
which was removed after the Bolshevik revolution. Meanwhile, the gov-
ernment of Vitebsk in 2014 put up a monument to Algirdas, the Grand 
Duke of Lithuania known for his dislike of Orthodox Christianity and 
for his violent raids on Moscow. Furthermore,	cases	of	the	desecration	
of	monuments	and	plaques	commemorating	Russian	heroes	(for	ex-
ample,	General	Alexander	Suvorov)	have	been	seen	in	various	parts	
of	the	country	since	2014.	It	is	worth	noting	that	Belarusian	law	en-
forcement	agencies,	which	usually	react	very	firmly	to	any	signs	
of	public	protest,	have	taken	a	relatively	passive	approach	to	this.	
18 However, it should be kept in mind that Konstanty Kalinowski was also employed by propa-
ganda in the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic as a representative of a peasant revolt 
(since he was from the right social class) against the Tsarist oppression. However, at pre-
sent this figure is in fact presented in Belarusian historiography more in the context of the 
struggle for the nation’s sovereignty, and this approach is most likely the subject of criti-
cism of the authors of the publication in question. 
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• Education is one of the most essential spheres of building a sense of dis-
tinctness and national identity in Belarus. Both governmental institu-
tions and numerous non-governmental organisations function very 
successfully in these two areas; and they often co-operate as part of in-
dividual projects. In most cases, the regime unofficially tolerates NGOs’ 
educational projects. This tolerance is sufficient to equate to serious 
support, given the hard authoritarian conditions in Belarus. The most 
Russophobic and at the same time most active Belarusian organisations 
include: the Francysk Skaryna Belarusian Language Society, the social 
campaign Budzma Belarusami (Let’s be Belarusians), and Minsk-based: 
Art Syadziba non-profit organisation, the Ў Gallery of Contemporary Art 
and the state Institute of Belarusian History and Culture. This group also 
includes: the nationwide Belarusian language course campaign Mova ci 
kava (Language or coffee) and its continuation Mova na nova (Language 
anew). More respect for the Belarusian language can also be noticed in 
the government’s narrative. Elements of Belarusian folklore, such as the 
famous vyshyvanka shirts, which are promoted – including among young 
people – as fashionable attributes of national distinctness, are also an im-
portant instrument of building the Belarusian national identity. 
• The activity of nationalist-leaning Belarusian political parties and so-
cial organisations poses a serious threat to the expansion of the ‘Rus-
sian World’ idea. Independence, as they understand it, is only possible 
in separation from Russia and also means negating such forms of co-
operation as the Union State of Russia and Belarus. Over	the	past	two	
years,	 the	nationalist-oriented	 section	of	 the	political	 opposition	
has	noticed	the	government	camp’s	increased	interest	in	strength-
ening	the	country’s	independence,	and	has	made	attempts	to	gain	
approval	 for	 its	 operation	 in	 this	 area.	Alyaksandr	Lukashenka,	
fearing	Russia’s	policy,	is	and	will	in	the	near	future	be	interested	
in	supporting	(most	often	unofficially)	the	operation	of	those	cir-
cles	which,	 guided	 by	 ideological	motives,	will	work	 for	 Belaru-
sian	independence	in	any,	even	the	most	difficult,	circumstances.	
The field of reinforcing Belarusian nationalism is dangerous to the 
implementation of Russian interests in Belarus. The Belarusian oppo-
sition structures which are especially active in this field include: the 
Belarusian People’s Front, the Conservative Christian Party – BPF and 
the Young Front. These circles are the main organisers of mass events 
which mobilise, bring together and consolidate those citizens of Belarus 
who have nationalist (and thus anti-Russian) views. Events of this type 
20
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 1
1/
20
16
doubtlessly include the annual marches commemorating key points in 
the history of resisting Russian expansion or harm inflicted by Russia. 
These are above all: Dzen Voli (Freedom Day) celebrated on 25 March on 
the anniversary of the proclamation of the Belarusian People’s Repub-
lic; the Chernobyl Route commemorating the Chernobyl catastrophe on 
26 April; and Dziady, i.e. the march held at the end of October to com-
memorate the mass executions of Belarusian elites by the NKVD in the 
late 1930s. Even though examples of these have not been especially nu-
merous over the past few years, if tension between Minsk and Moscow 
increases, they can be used (with at least tacit consent from the govern-
ment) to ignite anti-Russian sentiments in Belarus on a much larger 
scale than now. 
• Attempts to emancipate the Belarusian Orthodox Church (BOC) from 
the supremacy of Moscow Patriarchate have also been observed over 
the past few years. Since 2013, the Belarusian president, in the con-
text of increasing tension between Russia and Ukraine, has ever more 
frequently emphasised the need to accelerate the Belarusisation of the 
Church in Belarus, for example, through limiting the use of the Russian 
language in the liturgy and other manifestations of spiritual practices. 
At the same time, despite the lack of binding decisions and public dec-
larations from the Belarusian government, everything seems to indi-
cate that the idea of the autocephaly of the BOC is still being considered 
and that this idea is supported by a significant section of the Belarusian 
Orthodox clergy. Alyaksandr	 Lukashenka	wants	 to	 totally	 subor-
dinate	the	Orthodox	Church	in	Belarus	to	himself.	Moscow	views	
this	as	a	very	dangerous	move	because	 it	adversely	affects	one	of	
the	most	successful	elements	of	its	soft	power	in	Belarus	(and	also	
other	 former	Soviet	republics),	 i.e.	 the	Orthodox	Church	Moscow	
Patriarchate.	
• Another major threat to Russian interests in Belarus has thus far been 
underestimated–the activity of Belarusian football fans. Most of them 
belong to radical nationalist circles and, what is important in this case, 
are aggressively anti-Russian. It took very little time for these groups to 
back the demonstrations in Ukraine, and some of their members per-
sonally travelled to Ukraine to participate in events. Furthermore, the 
fans of FC Dinamo Minsk and FC Volna Pinsk demonstrated their ‘pro-
Bandera’ views in an open and very aggressive manner during their 
clubs’ matches. These	are	(predominantly)	young	men	with	radical	
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views	and	are	seasoned	fighters,	their	numbers	are	estimated	to	be	
in	the	thousands,	and	they	demonstrate	a	bitter	hostility	towards	
both	 Russia	 and	 any	 manifestations	 of	 Russian	 culture.	 Special	
concern	is	raised	by	the	rhetoric	used	by	these	circles	and	it	cannot	
be	ruled	out	that	they	may	play	an	essential	role	in	riots	linked	to	
any	possible	‘Belarusian	Maidan’.	
• The last serious problem from the point of view of the expansion of the 
‘Russian World’ is the fact that Belarusian citizens have been engaged 
in the fights in Ukraine on the side of the Ukrainian government. Be-
larusian volunteers are recruited via the aforementioned Belarusian 
nationalist organisations, above all the Young Front. Belarusian struc-
tures have also collected money on numerous occasions to support the 
Ukrainian units fighting in the Donbas, and some Belarusian independ-
ent media, such as Charter 97, have been used to promote the actions 
and general idea ofthe fight against the ‘Russian invader’. Even	though	
the	number	of	Belarusians	fighting	in	Ukraine	did	not	exceed	a	few	
dozen	at	any	one	time,	there	is	no	doubt	that	the	most	nationalist-
oriented	opposition	activists	have	gained	valuable	combat	experi-
ence	for	the	first	time	in	history.	Should	public	unrest	be	provoked	
in	Belarus,	these	people	may	become	very	successful	and	thus	dan-
gerous	 field	 commanders/coordinators	 of	 a	 ‘Belarusian	 Maidan’	
and	other	forms	of	street	protest.	
At the conclusion, Averyanov-Minsky and Maltsev warn of the consequences 
of the Kremlin’s further tolerating the intensifying nationalist sentiments in 
Belarus. At the same time, they recommend that the Russian media become 
more active in promoting the ‘Russian World’ idea, and this might be the start-
ing point for the ‘ideological struggle’ for Belarus in	which	Poland	is	one	of	
Moscow’s	main	opponents.	
The theses presented above form a rather coherent concept which on the one 
hand indicates that the authors have an extensive knowledge of Belarus’s his-
tory, mentality and the socio-political situation in contemporary Belarus. On 
the other hand, it can be noticed that they manipulate the facts to prove a theory 
they assumed to be right in advance. For example, the influence of the opposi-
tion and the third sector on the passive Belarusian public has definitely been 
overrated. The autonomous tendencies in the Belarusian Orthodox Church as 
well as the anti-Russian profile of Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s domestic and for-
eign policy have also been presented in a strongly exaggerated manner. It is thus 
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possible to have the impression that such texts have been commissioned by the 
Russian government and that their authors are tasked with proving (on the basis 
of a seemingly cool and reliable analysis) that Belarus, with its nationalism and 
anti-Russian sentiments, is gradually starting out on Ukraine’s path Ukraine, 
which may in the future lead to confrontation with Russia. The responsibil-
ity for this situation is unequivocally placed on Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who 
previously used to be presented for many years as Moscow’s closest ally in the 
post-Soviet area. It can thus be said that the image of the Belarusian president 
has changed fairly radically in the Russian experts’ narrative. Summing	up,	it	
needs	to	be	admitted	that	the	publication	Belarusian nationalism against 
the Russian World is	a	cynical,	skilfully	written	and	intellectually	corrupt	
concept	that	provides	grounds	for	intensifying	the	presence	of	Russian	
soft	power	in	Belarus.	However,	in	an	extreme	case,	the	theses	presented	
in	this	manner	can	also	be	employed	as	the	ideological	basis	for	Russia’s	
more	assertive	moves	to	ultimately	and	durably	subordinate	Belarus.	
An important addition to the publication under discussion is a separate, much 
shorter article by Kirill Averyanov-Minsky entitled How Soviet Belarus was en-
larged, which was published a few months earlier. The article describes the pro-
cess of forming the territory of the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic in the 
inter-war period and, more precisely, enlarging it (on the grounds of the Soviet 
government’s decision) by adding the territories which at present correspond 
more or less to its three oblasts: Vitebsk, Mogilev and Gomel. In the author’s 
opinion, ‘shifting’ these lands in 1924–1926 to become part of the Belarusian 
Soviet Socialist Republic was nothing other than an administrative decision 
taken by Moscow which was not backed by any arguments of a historical or 
ethnic nature. For this reason, Averyanov notices a striking similarity to the 
changes in the jurisdiction of Crimea or Donbas which were also made as part 
of the USSR. The	text	also	contains	a	directly	formulated	suggestion	that	
on	this	basis	independent	republics	might	be	proclaimed	in	the	future	in	
eastern	Belarus,	since	they	are	the	least	Belarusian	part	of	the	country19.	
Numerous articles published by various mutually unrelated authors on so-
called independent portals promoting the idea of a commonwealth of post-Sovi-
et countries as part of the ‘Russian World’ are of secondary importance, as they 
in a way reproduce the reasoning presented by the aforementioned experts. 
The most radical portals which raise the Belarusian issue in the neo-imperial 
19 See: http://sputnikipogrom.com/history/32029/bssr/#.V2kHt7Mkqid 
23
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 1
1/
20
16
context include: www.sputnikipogrom.com20 (Averyanov is the author of most 
publications concerning Belarus), www.bditelnost.info, www.svpressa.ru, 
www.politconservatizm.ru and www.14vn.com. Analytical-publicist materials 
criticising Belarus are also published from time to time in popular news portals, 
such as: Regnum (www.regnum.ru), Lenta.ru (www.lenta.ru) and Vzglad.ru 
(www.vz.ru). It appears that these publications are also coordinated and have 
the intention of making the message stronger in the new Russian interpretation, 
criticising Belarus and the policy of its government. 
The publications and statements from Russian experts referred to above have 
not as yet translated to Russian government policy towards Belarus. However, 
such an unprecedentedly massive scale of extremely negative opinions and the 
fact that some of their authors are affiliated to the government certainly justi-
fies the claim that this is part of the Kremlin’s strategy. Moscow is thus sug-
gesting to the Belarusian government that it is dissatisfied with Alyaksandr 
Lukashenka’s insufficient support for its policy in the post-Soviet area and with 
his policy (as Moscow views it) of strengthening Belarusian culture and the 
national awareness of Belarusians. Furthermore, although the radical evalua-
tions and proposals of actions to be taken for the time being remain only on the 
level of expert discourse, they also have to be understood as a warning that if 
Minsk continues strengthening its independence, Moscow may adopt a much 
tougher official policy. Hence, such a modified narrative of the Russian expert 
circles is the first, preliminary form of pressure on the Belarusian government, 
intended to hold back Belarus’s emancipation from the Russian political and 
cultural influence. 
2. The (seemingly) new concept of belarus belonging  
to the ‘Russian World’ 
In parallel to the massive criticism (outside the official inter-governmental 
channels) of the Belarusian government’s moves, some Russian experts have 
reformulated the old concept which provides grounds for Belarus belonging to 
the Russian sphere of political and cultural influence. The starting point in their 
argumentation is negating the maturity of the Belarusian ethnos due to both 
20 This Russian portal (registered in the USA) is one of the most controversial. It is quite 
strongly inclined towards neo-imperialism. Numerous publications present the radical 
views of authors repudiating any signs of the separateness of former Soviet republics, in-
cluding Belarus, from Russia. The portal stands out for its great dynamism and the high 
quality of the graphical layout of the published materials.
24
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 1
1/
20
16
the lack of real premises for the nation-building process and the dominance of 
other much stronger cultures, above all Russian culture and secondly Polish 
culture. One	consequence	of	negating	the	process	of	the	Belarusian	nation-
al	revival	in	the	late	19th/early	20th	centuries	is	a	theory	which	has	been	
gaining	popularity	over	the	past	few	years	that	Joseph	Stalin	played	a	key	
role	in	the	emergence	of	the	modern	Belarusian	nation.	Russian	authors	
argue	that	in	late	1920s/early	1930s	the	then	Soviet	leadership	was	conduct-
ing	a	self-interested	policy	which	involved	supporting	the	development	
of	local	languages	and	cultures	in	individual	republics,	and	these	actions	
also	covered	what	was	then	the	Belarusian	Soviet	Socialist	Republic.	Con-
sequently,	this	means	that	the	Belarusian	nation	is	in	a	way	an	artifi-
cial	product,	formed	top-down	by	the	Soviet	administration	apparatus21.	
Propagators of the ‘Russian World’ idea are also attacking the main foundation 
of the idea of Belarusian sovereignty, namely the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, 
which is referred to as a kind of founding myth by Belarusian nationalist cir-
cles and also, to an increasing extent, in the present governmental narrative. 
Their argument against the idea of the ‘European’ roots of Belarusian statehood 
originating from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania is that there was a strong Asian 
element in the Duchy, which was inhabited by a numerous group of Tatars22. 
These	deliberations	are	crowned	with	the	thesis	that	Belarusians	belong	
to	the	so-called	triune	nation,	along	with	Russians	and	Ukrainians.	This	
is	a	direct	reference	to	the	theory	coined	in	the	19th	century	by	Mikhail	
Koyalovich23	presenting	the	Russian	nation	as	a	grand	ethnos	consisting	
of	three	components:	Great	Russians	(Russians),	Little	Russians	(Ukrain-
ians)	and	Western	Russians	(Belarusians).	This	approach	meant	unques-
tionable	primacy	of	the	Russian	part	over	the	two	weaker	components.	
Orthodox Christianity was an important bonding factor in this community, 
making it anti-Catholic and anti-Western (in practice, above all anti-Polish)24. 
It is precisely this, in no way new, concept that is currently used by the Russian 
side as the historical grounds for Belarus belonging to the ‘Russian World’ in 
the broad meaning of the term and as a source of argumentation for the exist-
ence of cultural, mental, linguistic and civilisational bonds between Belarus 
21 For more information see: https://regnum.ru/news/polit/1863137.html 
22 For more information see: http://sputnikipogrom.com/history/52636/grand-asian-duchy-
of-lithuania/#.V1bXEzFf 3IU 
23 A 19th-century Russian historian and publicist of Belarusian descent. A supporter and the 
main theoretician of the ideology, based on Slavophilia and Orthodoxy, promoting the uni-
ty of Belarusians with Russia (and Ukraine), known as ‘Western Russism’. 
24 Eugeniusz Mironowicz, Białoruś, Wydawnictwo Trio, Warszawa 1999, pp. 12–13. 
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and Russia. This is also a tool used to justify the process of integration of the 
two countries (and in particular, the need to continue it) as part of the Union 
State of Belarus and Russia. In addition to the aforementioned theses, Russian 
propagators of the ‘Russian World’ present its content as a conservative ‘moral 
order’ based on such values as: the primacy of the community over the inter-
ests of the individuals, the superiority of the idea and the sense of justice over 
logic and economic calculations, serving the superior idea and the Orthodox 
ethic. The ‘Russian World’, as its supporters view it, is the only chance (also 
for Belarus) of being protected from the ‘decayed’ and ‘decadent’ culture of the 
consumerist West25. 
25 See: http://www.russkiymir.ru/fund/projects/1150th/roboty/esse/116885/ 
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III. MaNIfESTaTIONS Of THE pRESENCE  
Of RUSSIaN SOfT pOWER IN bElaRUS – aN aTTEMpT  
aT IDENTIfICaTION26
The post-Crimea narrative of Russian experts is critical of Alyaksandr 
Lukashenka and suggests that the presence of Russian soft power in the Be-
larusian cultural space should be intensified. The consequences of this include 
the activation and development of Russian and pro-Russian non-governmen-
tal organisations in Belarus. The attempt to classify them below predomi-
nantly covers those entities which have already been operating for some years, 
since they were established in the early 21st century and some in the 1990s. 
Few of them emerged fairly recently, i.e. at the time of the Ukrainian crisis. 
However,	given	the	context	of	the	situation	in	Ukraine	and	the	general	
increase	in	tensions	in	the	region,	their	operation	gains	a	completely	new	
character,	which	is	much	more	dangerous	to	Belarusian	sovereignty	and	
social	stability.	Most	of	these	entities	have	become	much	more	active	over	
the	past	two	years	as	a	consequence	of	intensified	financial	support	from	
the	public	budget	of	the	Russian	Federation	offered	via	various,	often	
difficult	to	trace	channels. The potential of pro-Russian organisations has 
been visibly developed and strengthened. Even though a clear-cut classifica-
tion of the structures which contribute to Russian soft power in Belarus is not 
entirely possible, it seems that the breakdown presented below will be optimal 
for understanding the special characteristics of this complex conglomerate of 
various organisations. 
1. Educational, cultural and youth associations
1.1. Associations which have the formal non-governmental 
organisation status
A number of officially registered organisations which have been in operation 
in Belarus already since the 1990s are engaged in the promotion of Russian cul-
ture, the Russian language and in educational activity in the broad meaning of 
26 The identification of these organisations is partly based on the list developed by the Belaru-
sian right-wing opposition organisation Young Front known as the Black Hundred List – for 
more information see: http://mfront.net/bielarus-na-parozie-vajny.html. However, this 
report takes into account only those organisations which are engaged in real activity and 
have any real impact. The remaining structures (which are not on the list developed by the 
opposition) have been identified on the basis of our own analysis of publications available 
on the Internet. 
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the term. It is worth noting that some of their initiatives do not refer directly 
to the Russian neo-imperial idea, but nevertheless fit in with the general mes-
sage as a whole pointing to the numerous links existing between Belarus and 
Russia’s culture and historical tradition. Some organisations from this group 
are tasked with working with the Russian diaspora in Belarus. The	central	
body	which	coordinates	the	operation	of	these	entities	is	the	Coordination	
Council	of	the	Heads	of	Russian	Organisations,	established	2007,	officially	
seated	at	the	Russian	embassy	in	Minsk27	(www.ross-bel.ru).	The	council	is	
chaired	by	Viktor	Gerashchenko,	a	writer,	editor-in-chief	of	Nashe Pravo-
slavie newspaper	and	director	of	the	‘Russian	House’	in	Vitebsk28. As can be 
concluded from the website, which is updated on a daily basis, the council is not 
a virtual body and carries out its tasks, such as holding sessions, consultative 
meetings, conferences and regular conventions of representatives of Russian 
social organisations from all regions of Belarus. The	resolution	of	its	tenth	
convention	held	on	28–29	May	2016	contains	firm	demands	indicating	that	
this	structure	demonstrates	a	high	level	of	assertiveness	in	the	area	of	
promoting	the	‘Russian	World’	idea.	The	numerous	high-priority	tasks	of	
the	Russian	structures	in	Belarus	include:	the	popularisation	of	actions	
commemorating	the	Great	Patriotic	War,	i.e.	the	‘ribbon	of	Saint	George’	
and	‘The	Immortal	Regiment’;	an	intensification	of	work	with	young	peo-
ple,	in	particular,	military-patriotic	education29,	organising sport classes 
and mass cultural events, youth camps, etc.; making efforts to open Russian aca-
demic and cultural centres in Mogilev, Vitebsk and Grodno; and counteracting 
those discrediting pro-Russian organisations in the ‘Belarusian opposition and 
nationalist media’30. At present, as stated on the website, the council consists 
of fifteen organisations31, the most active being: the Belarusian section of the 
27 This is official affiliation aimed at guaranteeing protection to these organisations should 
potential measures be taken by the Belarusian government. The council’s office is located in 
the stately building of the agency of the capital city of Moscow in the centre of Minsk (the 
role played by Moscow House will be discussed in more detail further in this text). 
28 In 2011, Gerashchenko lost his position at Vitebsk city hall for his openly pro-Russian, neo-
imperial statements.
29 This gives rise to the impression that the council officially supports training camps held in 
Belarus and Russia by pro-Russian (e.g. Cossack) military associations – this issue will be 
discussed in more detail in the next part of this chapter. 
30 All these entities are officially registered at the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Be-
larus and operate legally. For more information see: http://ross-bel.ru/about/news_post/
rezolyutsiya-kh-belorusskoy-respublikanskoy-konferentsii-obshchestvennykh-obyedi-
neniy-rossiyskikh-sootechestvennikov 
31 See: http://ross-bel.ru/sostav-koordinacionnogo-soveta-soot. The association of Belarusian 
alumni of Russian universities ‘Inkorvuz-Almamater’ is at the organisation stage. 
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youth movement ‘Young Russia’ (www.rumol.org), the Culture and Education 
Social Association ‘Our Rus’, the Nationwide Social Association ‘Russian Com-
munity’, The Belarusian Social Association ‘Rus’ and two regional associations 
in Vitebsk (www.vitrusdom.narod.ru) and Mogilev named ‘Russian Home’, and 
the Mogilev-based Russian Culture and Education Association (www.rkpo.ucoz.
ru). Special attention needs to be paid to ‘Young Russia’ which is tasked with 
working with young Belarusian people and holding sports and educational 
events promoting the ‘Russian World’ values. This structure is led by Sergey 
Lushch, who has the reputation of being one of the most charismatic and effi-
cient coordinators active in pro-Russian organisations. The organisation’s web-
site is graphically appealing and is administered with great dynamism. 
1.2. The Russian government’s agendas
The Belarusian branch of Rossotrudnichestvo, the Russian governmental Fed-
eral Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States (it reports to the Rus-
sian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Compatriots Living Abroad and International 
Humanitarian Co-operation is a structure which is financed directly from the 
budget of the Russian Federation. Its Minsk office, the Russian Science and 
Culture Centre (www.blr.rs.gov.ru) is engaged in extensive activity aimed at 
promoting Russian culture and the Russian language. A Russian Science and 
Culture Centre has also been in operation in Brest since 2014. The profile of 
its activity is similar to that of the Minsk office (www.blr.rs.gov.ru/projects/
rcnk-v-breste). Viktor Malashenko, a retired KGB staff officer, has directed the 
Belarusian branch of Rossotrudnichestvo since 201232. 
‘Moscow House’, i.e. the Minsk agency of the Russian capital city (and, more 
precisely, of the Russian state-owned firm the Moscow Centre of International 
Co-operation) warrants a separate description. The agency was opened in July 
2009 and is located in a purpose-built office located in the centre of Minsk, con-
structed using money from the Moscow government. According to information 
which can be found on ‘Moscow House’s’ website (www.mkdc.by), the goals of its 
operation include: supporting the development of the Moscow government’s co-
operation with its Belarusian partners, actions for the development of trade and 
investing capital originating from Moscow in Belarus, attracting Belarusian 
32 Viktor Michurin, an employee of the Minsk office, has recently been performing the duties 
of the office’s director for unknown reasons. Since there is no information whatsoever, it is 
difficult to conclude whether this has been caused by Malashenko’s temporary absence or if 
it signals a long-term change in this position. 
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investment capital in Moscow, and cultural and educational actions, including 
support for the Russian diaspora in Belarus. It	appears	that	the	latter	aspect	
of	its	operation	has	gained	special	significance	over	the	past	two	years.	
‘Moscow	House’	has	become	an	informal	Russian	soft	power	‘coordination	
centre’	in	Belarus.	The	offices	of	the	Coordination	Council	of	the	Heads	
of	Russian	Organisations and	Rossotrudnichestvo	are	located	there,	and	
it	is	also	the	venue	of	most	events	held	by	Russian	organisations	operat-
ing	in	Minsk.	Furthermore, since 2016 ‘Moscow House’ has been home to the 
modern multi-media Press Centre of the Russian branch of the Sputnik portal, 
i.e. the only Russian media outlet specialising in Belarusian issues operating 
in Belarus. 
1.3. Social networking groups 
Initiatives of a more virtual and informal nature form a separate sub-group. 
This concerns above all any kinds of themed groups established on the most 
popular social networking portals in the post-Soviet area, such as vkontakte.
ru. Using this tool, propagators of the ‘Russian World’ reach tens of thousands 
of (predominantly young) Belarusians who are members of such groups. One 
example of such activity is ‘Antimaidan Belarus’, a resilient group which very 
clearly demonstrates its neo-imperial views (http://vk.com/antimaidan_by). 
This group currently has around 2,700 members from various regions of Bela-
rus. Another group of this kind (albeit with a more expert-oriented profile) is 
‘Zapadnorusskoye Vozrozhdeniye’ (http://vk.com.zapadnorusizm). This group 
has over 1,000 members. 
2. Organisations with a military-sports profile 
•	 Several Cossack organisations are active in Belarus, even though the coun-
try has no historical Cossack traditions that could be compared to the 
Ukrainian or Russian military culture. Although they do not have as many 
members as their counterparts from other post-Soviet countries, their 
activity profile and ideological foundations are very similar. Belarusian 
Cossack associations are focused on working with young people, placing 
particular emphasis on organising martial art courses, firearm use train-
ing, horse riding lessons, etc. For this reason representatives of Belarusian 
Cossack circles are actively engaged in educational work at schools across 
the country as part of various educational programmes (for example, the 
‘Drug-free City’ action held by the Kazachiy Spas organisation). Their real 
goal is the recruitment and selection of young boys for participation 
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in military and sports classes taught in the spirit of the ‘Russian 
World’ values. Cossacks are also trying to establish close co-operation 
the military-profile classes at belarusian secondary schools or cadet 
schools operating in some cities (for example, in vitebsk) with the aim 
of taking control of them. Their message also appeals to young activists 
of the regime-linked youth organisations, such as the Belarusian Republi-
can Youth Union (BRSM). Children with abusive parents are an important 
target group for them since, in exchange for food and the sense of commu-
nity, they can be taught total loyalty, which translates as a readiness to take 
up even the most difficult tasks33. Young people recruited using various 
methods have been sent to camps organised in Russia on a regular 
basis for a few years by Cossacks and other organisations (these will 
be mentioned in the next parts of this text). These camps are usually 
presented as fashionable ‘survival schools’. In reality, in addition to 
the official programme, they are trained how to handle and use vari-
ous weapons, including firearms, and are taught martial arts. Their 
instructors include volunteers seasoned in battle from the troops 
fighting on the side of the luhansk and Donetsk people’s Republics34. 
According to a tradition dating back to the times of the Russian Empire, 
all Cossack organisations co-operate closely with the Belarusian Orthodox 
Church, thus increasing the range of influence and respect among the Or-
thodox section of Belarusian society. Characteristically, a part of these cir-
cles also make political demands directly concerning the Belarusian gov-
ernment. Mikalai Ulakhovich, one of the leaders of the Cossack movement 
in Belarus, the ataman of the ‘Belarusian Cossacks’ organisation (he ran for 
president in 2015), announced directly at the convention he had convened 
in Minsk in early February 2016 that his organisation would put up candi-
dates in parliamentary elections this year. At the same time, he declared 
he was prepared to form a regular Cossack army to “protect Belarus from 
NATO”35. Regardless of the scope of operation, the number of members 
33 See: https://informnapalm.org/15874-voyny-russkogo-myra-v-belarusy/ 
34 The weekly Nasha Niva has published as part of a journalist investigation extensive materi-
als on several occasions over the past few months concerning summer camps organised for 
Belarusian young people in Russia, as well as current work of Belarusian Cossacks in Bela-
rus. The publications include many reliable details and are backed by rich photographic and 
video documentation. The publication of 16 May 2016 concerned such events held in Vitebsk 
Oblast. See: http://nn.by/?c=ar&i=170171&lang=ru 
35 Much seems to suggest that Ulakhovich’s activity is one of the Belarusian security appa-
ratus’s (so far not numerous) attempts to take control of the pro-Russian movements (this 
issue is outlined in more detail in chapter IV). 
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and affiliation, the thing all belarusian Cossack organisations have in 
common is the affirmation of the conservative Russian imperial order 
based on Orthodoxy and bitter criticism of the ‘decayed West’36. The 
most active Cossack organisations in Belarus at present include: the ‘Bela-
rusian Cossacks’ (www.belkazak.by) and ‘Kazachiy Spas’ (www.kazak.by) 
referred to above. Furthermore, the following smaller organisations, oper-
ating on the regional level can be distinguished: the Cossack Unit at Saint 
Elisabeth Monastery in Minsk, the Club of Cossacks of Babruysk ‘Yermak’, 
the Grodno-based association ‘Cossacks of the Neman’, the military-patri-
otic club ‘Fatherland’ also based in Grodno, Cossacks from the 7th Y. Bak-
lanov Minsk Half-Hundred, the Cossack military-patriotic club in Orsha, 
the Cossack Guard of Peacekeeping Forces, and a branch of Kuban-based 
Cossacks ‘The Gate of the Lake Region’. It is difficult to estimate the number 
of their actual members and the real scope of their operation in the case of 
most of these structures. It is suspected that the activity of some of them is 
limited to sporadic events held mainly on the occasion of the most impor-
tant anniversaries, e.g. on 9 May. Nevertheless, some of them operate on 
a constant basis, although their operation is not of a large-scale character. 
According to rough estimates, the number of Belarusian Cossacks is not 
higher than 1,000 to 2,000 operating activists. It also needs to be empha-
sised that ‘Belarusian Cossacks’, theoretically the largest of these organisa-
tions, is not a uniform and compact structure. Local atamans have a high 
degree of independence, and some of the regional groups do not accept the 
supremacy of the central command in Minsk, and instead the contact the 
Cossack circles in Russia directly. 
•	 The afghanistan war veterans, who are still numerous and active 
in belarus and who operate as part of the Social association of the 
belarusian Union of afghanistan War veterans, occupy an impor-
tant position in the group of paramilitary organisations. It needs to 
be emphasised that there are no evident grounds to claim that this or-
ganisation as a whole is engaged in promoting the ‘Russian World’ in Be-
larus. It is highly likely that the local Vitebsk-based organisation named 
‘Brotherhood’(www.afgan.by) led by Valery Ananchenko is pro-Russian. 
Activists from this organisation do not hide their support for the Kremlin’s 
36 The favourite fact which is most frequently referred to in order to discredit the West in the 
opinion of these circles and other groups which share a similar ideology is the right to enter 
into same-sex marriages applicable in some EU member states. This argument is usually 
sufficient to brand the whole of European culture as debauched. 
32
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 1
1/
20
16
neo-imperial narrative and are among those organising the paramilitary 
summer camps in Russia for Belarusian schoolchildren37. Everything sug-
gests that they have close contacts with the Cossack movement. 
•	 In addition to the semi-military Cossack organisations and associations 
of Afghanistan war veterans which draw upon military traditions, other 
structures tasked with improving the physical education of young people 
combined with promoting the idea of Russian dominance are also in opera-
tion in Belarus. One example of such separate, difficult-to-qualify entities 
is the Belarusian Federation of Russian Martial Arts (www.ross.by). 
•	 Political organisations which have the nature of paramilitary fighting 
squads form a separate group. This above all concerns the Belarusian 
branch of the Russian National Bolshevik movement, who are present 
above all on the social networking portal vkontakte.ru (http://vk.com/
belnb), where they are engaged in propaganda and information activity, 
including tracking the anti-Russian moves of the Belarusian government 
and watching the activity of Belarusian nationalist organisations. The 
group has around 1,000 members. Another organisation, known already in 
the 1990s for its extremist activity in Belarus, the Russian National Unity 
movement (Russian abbreviation RNE; http://vk.com/rne_belarus), is also 
present on this portal. This group has only 200 members, but its activity is 
much more serious since it is aimed (or at least was in 2014–2015) at recruit-
ing young Belarusians to units which fight on the side of eastern Ukrainian 
separatists38. 
3. Initiatives under the patronage of the belarusian Orthodox 
Church of the Moscow patriarchate 
•	 Structures affiliated to some Orthodox temples or monasteries, many of 
which are even co-managed by the clergy from the Belarusian Orthodox 
Church, hold an important position among the pro-Russian organisa-
tions operating in Belarus. Their activity shows that the Church is one 
of the essential instruments employed for promoting the ‘Russian 
World’ in belarus. The best proof of this is the long-lasting operation 
37 This was meticulously documented in the above mentioned journalist investigation con-
ducted by Nasha Niva newspaper. See: http://nn.by/?c=ar&i=170171&lang=ru
38 See: http://by24.org/2014/05/11/russian_neo_nazis_recruit_mercenaries_for_ukraine_
in_belarus 
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of so-called Orthodox military-patriotic clubs. Over twenty of these 
clubs are currently active in belarus, including eight in grodno 
Oblast. These organisations have both an Orthodox and a paramili-
tary profile. Their offer is targeted at young people aged between 12 and 
18 years. Sports classes, with a special emphasis placed on close combat, 
are the main, albeit not the only, form of their operation. Another im-
portant component are educational classes during which pro-Russian 
and anti-Western religious and political contents are inculcated into the 
young participants. The teachers are usually former military officers and 
officers of the security apparatus, and the management duties are also 
shared by Orthodox clergymen many of whom collaborated with the law 
enforcement agencies or the army in the past. Dependent on the local 
background, the clubs’ activity is supported by Cossacks and/or Afghani-
stan war veterans. furthermore, in many cases such organisations 
are supported (officially or in most cases unofficially) by the local 
administration and, most importantly, by active police officers and 
high-ranking officers from the State Committee of border Troops39. 
It is worth adding in this context that the clubs are an important link in 
the system of recruiting participants for the above-mentioned military 
camps and of organising the camps. 
•	 The Belarusian Orthodox Church is also engaged in the evangelisation of 
young people, which per se is a politically neutral, important and completely 
understandable area of activity of any church. However, some of these ini-
tiatives are exercised in an overtly pro-Russian context, precisely copying 
the narrative of the propagators of the ‘Russian World’. The annual Ortho-
dox Youth Festival (which takes place in the summer) held under the slogan 
‘Procession to the Stalin Line’ is a model example of this phenomenon. This 
event gives rise to so much controversy because it is held at a place symbol-
ising the period of Stalinist repressions which were also targeted against 
the church. This pro-Russian festival is organised by Maksim Loginov, the 
protodeacon of the Minsk diocese, who is in charge of the pastoral minis-
try of young people. He also directs another pro-Russian organisation, the 
Brotherhood of Saint Dovmont of Pskov. 
39 Abundant and convincing documentation concerning the clubs’ activity and their con-
nections was collected and published in February 2016 by the portal InformNapalm, see: 
https://informnapalm.org/20464-taliban-v-belarusi/ This issue was also investigated a lit-
tle earlier by Nasha Niva journalists, see: http://nn.by/?c=ar&i=158906&lang=ru 
34
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 1
1/
20
16
4. The Russian and pro-Russian media
•	 The media is used in the Kremlin’s policy as one of the key instruments for 
propagating the ‘Russian World’ idea in the entire post-Soviet area, including 
Belarus. There is no language barrier in Belarus nor is there the approach ne-
gating the information message from Russia seen in the Baltic and South Cau-
casus countries (in extreme cases also manifestations of Russian culture are 
opposed there). This offers the Russian media almost unlimited room for ma-
noeuvre in the Belarusian media space. Their effectiveness has been proven by 
the latest research conducted by independent Belarusian sociologists reveal-
ing a high level of support for integration with Russia among the citizens of Be-
larus40. Russian television (above all due to cable Tv providers) is widely 
available and has a rich offer which is appealing to averagely and poorly 
educated belarusian citizens, especially its long criminal series and soap 
operas. It successfully promotes such pathologies as: excessive drinking, 
corruption, violence and aggression in human relations. Russian publi-
cist talk-shows to which radical Russian politicians are more frequently in-
vited than moderate ones are slightly less popular. The brutal style of public 
debate offered in such shows and the unequivocally formulated evaluations of 
the West and the situation in the post-Soviet area41 may also affect the world 
view of a section of the Belarusian public. At present, the most popular Rus-
sian channels in Belarus are: NTV-Belarus, RTR-Belarus, REN TV, ORT and 
Dom Kino (all of them are broadcast one hour later than Moscow time, which 
allows the Belarusian operators to select their content). As the Belarusian gov-
ernment has recently admitted, Russian production at present fills as much 
as 65% of the Belarusian media space42, which is clear proof of the vast pos-
sibilities the Russian media has to influence ordinary Belarusian citizens. 
•	 One characteristic manifestation of Russia’s information policy in Belarus 
is the operation of the multi-media network ‘Sputnik’, which was launched 
40 The current sentiments of the Belarusian public with regard to their eastern neighbour 
have been presented in more detail in chapter IV. 
41 One example of this kind of narrative is Vladimir Solovyev’s show ‘Voskresny vecher’ 
(‘Sunday night’) broadcast in Belarus by the Rossiya TV channel. The participants of the 
debate on the show which was broadcast on 22 May 2016 expressed their concern that “the 
West might destabilise the situation in Belarus.” See: http://russia.tv/video/show/brand_
id/21385/episode_id/1302433/video_id/1476249/viewtype/picture/ 
42 This data was presented by the deputy head of the Belarusian Presidential Administration, 
Igor Buzovsky, in an interview on 15 May 2016 for the Belarusian TV channel ONT. See: 
http://news.21.by/other-news/2016/05/16/1191441.html
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in November 201443 as part of the structures of the Russian News Agency 
‘Rossiya Segodnya’ led by an experienced journalist and one of the best-
known propagators of the Kremlin’s policy, Dmitry Kiselyov. The Belaru-
sian section began its work in December 2014 and at the initial stage of its 
operation took over most journalists of the Belarusian branch of the Inter-
fax agency (Interfax-Zapad). It is worth noting that andrey kachura, 
who was nominated as head of the belarusian team, had worked for 
some time at the press Team of the belarusian kgb Directorate for 
Minsk and Minsk Oblast44. Over the past few months, the portal’s activity 
has been expanded to include an Internet radio station and a modern Mul-
timedia Centre (located in ‘Moscow House’). Since the beginning of its 
operation the news portal www.sputnik.by has stood out for its high 
level of graphical layout and the quality of its publications, which 
is most likely the effect of its good financing. furthermore, its high 
budget allows it to regularly take belarusian journalists from both 
independent and state-controlled media outlets. It should also should 
be remembered that, given the continuing reductions in the financing of 
the third sector by Western donors and the decline in living standards in 
Belarus in general, even those journalists and people representing culture 
circles who oppose Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s regime and Russia itself may 
agree to co-operate with Sputnik, seeing this as currently the only chance 
not only for a decent wage but also for access to cutting-edge equipment 
and (which is equally important) professional development understood in 
a certain way45. This is even more understandable given the fact that sput-
nik.by has not been engaged in an aggressive information campaign target-
ed against the Belarusian government or Belarusian culture. Furthermore, 
the portal has a parallel Belarusian language version and gives information 
about events promoting the Belarusian language and culture. This policy 
43 This is a media project created by the International News Agency ‘Rossiya Segodnya’ (for-
merly RIA Novosti). Sputnik is tasked with promoting the Russian media message (and thus 
also the ‘Russian World’ idea) abroad, including in the post-Soviet area. There are plans to 
open local editors’ teams in over 30 countries where, alongside the Russian version, a ver-
sion in the local language will be provided. The assumption is that all the national branches 
will operate as multimedia hubs, each consisting of: a news agency, an on-line radio station, 
editorial staff of the news portal and a press centre. Each branch will employ between 30 
and 70 people. 
44 See: http://jourdom.ru/news/61325
45 Much controversy was provoked in May 2016 by Alexander Pomidorov’s decision to ac-
cept a job offer from the editorial staff of Sputnik.by. Pomidorov (his proper name is Kriv-
osheyev), a musician and journalist, has worked, for example, for Radio Liberty and is 
known for opposing the Belarusian regime and anti-Russian views. 
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allows the editors to successfully avoid strict categorisation and accusa-
tions that they present the facts is a biased manner so as to strengthen the 
influence of the ‘Russian World’ in the Belarusian media space. In under 
one and a half years of operation, Sputnik.by has become a strong and dy-
namic team ready to present variously oriented information. Sputnik, 
being Russian government project, if necessary, may become in a rel-
atively short time an effective and thus dangerous tool of the krem-
lin’s propaganda. The initiative of expanding the scope of co-operation as 
part of the Radio-TV Organisation of the Union State (Russian abbrevia-
tion TRO) has a similar character. According to declarations made by its 
head, Igor Ugolnikov, TRO is expected to increase the presence of Russian 
regional TV channels in Belarus by 2016 and to become engaged in the mu-
tual promotion of the regions of Belarus and Russia. This co-operation is 
understandable, if one considers the logic of the functioning of the Union 
State but should be recognised as dangerous, given the entrenchment of 
the model of thinking in the mindsets of citizens of the two countries that 
the administrational units (oblasts) of each of them are entities of a sin-
gle state. The fact that Russia is promoting the benefits of building closer 
bilateral relations on the regional level, without the participation of the 
central administration, should also be viewed as dangerous. The cycle of 
programmes promoting the administrational entities of Russia (such as: 
Astrakhan, Ufa, Murmansk, Grozny, the Republic of Khakassia, Leningrad 
Oblast, Samara, Vologda, the Komi Republic) and Belarus (at the first stage 
these will be Mogilev, Vitebsk and Brest) is intended to serve this purpose. 
As Ugolnikov said, programmes “acceptable for broadcast in the Union 
State dimension” will be cleared for broadcast. 
5. The pro-Russian publicist and news portals 
Several Belarusian non-governmental pro-Russian portals of minor impact 
which aspire to be viewed as expert publicist opinion-building media outlets 
have been in operation in Belarus for many years. The portal which has the most 
political profile is Imperiya (www. imperiya.by), run by Yuri Baranchik, the di-
rector of the Analytical Centre of the Academy of Public Administration under 
the aegis of the President of the Republic of Belarus in Minsk. Baranchik for 
many years was a commentator at the Regnum portal and was actively engaged 
in the operation of pro-Russian circles in Belarus46. The portal was for many 
46 According to unofficial information, Baranchik has also work for the Operational-Analyti-
cal Centre, i.e. one of the institutions which form part of the Belarusian secret services. 
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years the only visible manifestation of a Russian presence in the Belarusian 
media space, but it could never match any of the leading Belarusian independ-
ent Internet media outlets in terms of scope of impact. The website’s operation 
was suspended recently, and Baranchik himself left for Moscow, where he is 
a member of Sputnik’s central team of editors. Novaya Ekonomika (www.new-
economics.info) is another niche profile wielding even less impact with long 
traditions. This portal is still operating. Sergey Shiptenko, a Belarusian his-
torian and economist, is the founder and editor-in-chief of this portal and the 
coordinator of a foundation bearing the same name. The activity of this portal 
is limited to publishing twice a year an expert bulletin titled Novaya Ekono-
mika mostly containing highly specialised political and economic analyses. It is 
worth paying attention to Shiptenko’s activity as a publicist. Given his numer-
ous publications on many portals and participation in numerous conferences, 
he can be classified as one of the most active propagators of the ‘Russian World’ 
in Belarus. Until the beginning of 2016 his texts were published on the Reg-
num portal, but he is no longer active there. The	historical	portal	Zapadnaya 
Rus’	(www.zapadrus.su)	is	the	most	dynamic	in	the	group	of	pro-Russian	
expert	publicist	projects	which	have	existed	for	years.	Igor	Zelenkovsky,	
a	member	of	the	Union	of	Russian	Writers,	is	in	charge	of	this	project.	The	
editorial	team’s	mission	is	to	prove	and	propagate	the	idea	that	Belarus	
belongs	historically	to	the	great	triune	ethnos	of	Rus’.	Around 100 academ-
ics and publicists (mainly educated in history and/or philosophy) from Belarus 
and Russia co-operate with the portal. 
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Iv. THE bElaRUSIaN gOvERNMENT’S UNDECIDED pOlICY 
WITH REgaRD TO THE THREaT Of THE ExpaNSION Of 
RUSSIaN SOfT pOWER
1. The superficial belarusisation vs. the Soviet paradigms 
in historical policy and state ideology 
The vast catalogue of accusations Russian experts address to the Belarusian 
government may create the impression that there has been a policy of the Be-
larusisation of public life aimed at marginalising the Russian language and 
culture underway over the past few years in Belarus. Alyaksandr Lukashenka 
has been quoted as emphasising the importance of the Belarusian language and 
the need to bring up young people in a spirit of national awareness47. Further-
more, the Russian media have also tracked the statements of all representa-
tives of the Belarusian state apparatus (not only the most senior government 
officials) which even to the slightest degree refer to the issue of strengthening 
the role of the Belarusian language in the various aspects of the functioning of 
the state48. However,	the	truth	is	that	Alyaksandr	Lukashenka’s	regime	
has	for	many	years	been	conducting	a	policy	of	reducing	the	role	of	the	
Belarusian	language	and	has	maintained	and	even	enhanced	the	scope	of	
use	of	the	Russian	language. The real share of the two national languages49 in 
Belarusian public life can be best tracked using the example of data concerning 
school education on all levels. In the school year 1994–1995 (when Belarusian 
was the only official language) around 75% of first grade pupils received their 
education in the Belarusian language, while the share for all age groups was 
40%. The referendum in 1995, when Russian was also granted official language 
status, marked the beginning of the tendency to reduce the share of the Bela-
rusian language in school education. In the school year 2012–2013, already 83% 
of pupils received their education only in Russian, and 17% in Belarusian. One 
47 A fragment of Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s speech at the 42nd Congress of the Belarusian 
Youth Union (Russian abbreviation: BRSM) held in January 2015 in Minsk provoked numer-
ous comments. The Belarusian president emphasised that it is very important that young 
people should be brought up and educated in the spirit of awareness of cultural distinctness 
and know the Belarusian language. See: http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/42-oj-
sjezd-belorusskogo-respublikanskogo-sojuza-molodezhi-10682/ 
48 On 8 May 2016, the Regnum portal published an article by a Belarusian historian criticising 
the speech of Valentina Moroz, a lecturer at a school of the Belarusian Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, who said that the role of the Belarusian language needed to be strengthened as a fac-
tor of the national security of Belarus. See: https://regnum.ru/news/polit/2129569.html 
49 Pursuant to Article 17 of the Belarusian constitution, Russian and Belarusian have the sta-
tus of national languages. 
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year later, the proportions were even more disadvantageous, and reached 86% 
and 14%. This proves that the Belarusian government has for years accepted the 
intensifying (re-)Russification of school education. The natural consequences of 
this situation include a constant decrease in the number of grades and schools 
with Belarusian as the language of instruction, most of which are located in the 
provinces50. The only (secondary) school to have Belarusian as the language of 
instruction in Minsk at present is the Yakub Kolas Humanities Lyceum, which 
functions illegally in the light of Belarusian law. As	a	result	of	this	tendency,	
in	2015	only	24%	of	secondary	school	graduates	decided	to	take	secondary-
school	final	examinations	in	Belarusian,	and	76%	chose	Russian	(in	2007,	
this	proportion	was	42%	against	58%)51. Only in January 2015, most likely in 
part influenced by the developments in Ukraine, did the Belarusian government 
begin taking its first steps towards a real (and not only declared) strengthening 
of the Belarusian language’s role in education. The newly appointed minister 
for education, Mikhail Zhuravkov, said that the subjects of the history and ge-
ography of Belarus should be taught only in Belarusian52. One year later it was 
announced that the number of hours of Belarusian and Russian language classes 
would be made equal, regardless of a school’s language profile53. However, there 
is no precise date that would allow an evaluation of the degree to which the 
changes have been implemented, which suggests that these are merely plans 
at the present stage. 
Given this situation, it is difficult to disagree with the opinion commonly shared 
by independent Belarusian experts suggesting that the government is only go-
ing through the motions of promoting the Belarusian language and Belarusian 
culture. Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s regime, which is to a great extent based 
on the Soviet tradition, supports manifestations of Belarusianness in certain 
50 According to a survey commissioned by the Belarusian organisation Solidarity with Be-
larus Information Office (located in Warsaw, Poland), even data stating that 14% of pupils 
currently receive education in Belarusian could be overstated. According to results of the 
expert opinion, in fact some of the classes are taught in Russian anyway. This is partly an 
effect of the stereotype deeply rooted in people’s mindsets that education received in the 
‘terminologically poorer’ and ‘small-town’ Belarusian language is of lower quality. See: 
http://belarusinfocus.info/by/p/6062obrazovanie_na_belorusskom_yazyke_ostaetsya_
na_glubokoy_periferii 
51 See: http://krynica.info/ru/2016/02/22/tolko-14-shkolnikov-obuchayutsya-po-beloruss-
ki/; http://news.tut.by/society/484321.html 
52 See: http://news.tut.by/society/432381.html. The Belarusian minister’s statement was com-
mented on in an emotional way by the Russian media, see: http://www.pravda.ru/news/
world/formerussr/belorussia /27-01-2015/1245781-belarus-0/ 
53 See: http://naviny.by/rubrics/society/2016/2/11/ic_news_116_470653/ 
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areas, mainly linked to: folklore, folk art, poetry and literature, as well as street 
names and the entire extensive sphere of information in public places, such as 
announcements in the Minsk underground and at railways and bus stations. In 
turn, Russian predominates in all other areas (including government agencies 
and other state administration entities) as the language used in communication 
with citizens. This policy strengthens the stereotypical distinction between 
Russian, which is viewed as the dominant language that is rich in diversified 
terminology, and Belarusian, which is believed to be a ‘less developed’ language 
and thus unsuitable for more extensive use. It seems that such cautious and 
simultaneously limited measures taken by the Belarusian government to sup-
port the Belarusian language on the one hand are an effect of the belief that 
Belarus belongs to the same civilisational area as Russia. On the other hand, 
this is linked to the experience from the early 1990s, which is still living in the 
memory of a great part of the Belarusian nomenklatura (and also the moderate 
section of the opposition), when Belarusian was suddenly granted the status of 
the only national language54 and this provoked extremely negative reactions 
from a significant part of the post-Soviet establishment, who viewed this move 
as an act of marginalising a great part of Belarusian citizens who had no links 
with Belarusian culture. 
It	needs	to	be	remembered	that	the	participation	of	Belarusians	in	the	
so-called	Great	Patriotic	War	and	(to	a	lesser	extent)	the	achievements,	
mainly	in	the	areas	of	education	and	industrialisation	reached	by	the	Be-
larusian	Soviet	Socialist	Republic	as	part	of	the	USSR	form	an	essential	
part	of	the	Belarusian	regime’s	ideology,	a	kind	of	founding	myth	for	the	
country.	This	means	that	the	Belarusian	government’s	language	and	his-
torical	policy	must	take	these	circumstances	into	account,	maintaining	
the	proper	proportions,	so	as	to	ensure	that	the	state	ideology	matches	the	
reality.	Hence the constant search for a compromise and equilibrium between 
the national and the post-Soviet (and at the same time pro-Russian) narratives 
visible in the government’s actions, proof of which can be found in the exam-
ple of Vitebsk, where a monument to Alexander Nevsky was erected in June 
201655. This move was most likely intended to counterbalance the erection of 
54 The decision to this effect was passed in 1991 by the Belarusian parliament on the Belaru-
sian People’s Front’s initiative. In a referendum held in 1995 most citizens of Belarus voted 
for granting equal status to Russian and Belarusian as national (official) languages. How-
ever, in fact this was the beginning of bringing back the dominance of the Russian language 
in almost all spheres of public life. 
55 See: http://www.kp.by/online/news/2427633/ 
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the monument to Grand Duke Algirdas two years earlier in this city, which 
pro-Russian circles viewed as controversial and criticised56. Furthermore, the 
introduction of modern multimedia and museum technology at the new Great 
Patriotic War Museum, which was solemnly opened in Minsk in 2014, was not 
accompanied by a change in the narrative. The heroism of the great majority of 
Belarusians (as part of the USSR) in the war against Nazi Germany is still the 
main message of the display, while more controversial issues, such as large-scale 
collaboration with the Nazi occupier and the animosity felt by a significant part 
of the residents of Belarus towards Soviet guerrillas have been almost com-
pletely overlooked57. It is difficult to brand the policy of restoring and rebuilding 
monuments referring to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania adopted over the past 
few years as clearly anti-Russian, even though this is also criticised by Russia. 
This mainly concerns the castles in the western part of Belarus (Mir, Nesvizh, 
Lida) and also historic city centres (the Upper Town in Minsk). Although these 
objects strengthen the awareness of the presence of European elements in Be-
larusian history among the Belarusian public, they have not been used by the 
government to negate the tradition of the coexistence of Russians and Belaru-
sians in the Russian Empire and then in the Soviet Union. 
The	examples	presented	above	illustrate	the	extremely	cautious	and	lim-
ited	nature	of	the	Belarusian	government’s	policy	aimed	at	strengthening	
the	Belarusian	language	and	culture.	Some	actions	are	mutually	contra-
dictory,	which	is	a	result	of	the	need	to	maintain	equilibrium	between	
each	country’s	need	to	develop	its	own	typical	identity	and	the	awareness	
of	respecting	the	cultural	community	of	Belarus	and	Russia.	Considering 
centuries-long traditions and the different potentials of the two nations, the 
Russian language and Russia’s cultural achievements still clearly prevail. At 
present, we can only talk about a superficial Belarusisation of the political and 
social space in Belarus. This means that we are still witnessing an inept attempt 
to oppose the increasing expansion of the Russian civilisational offer branded 
as ‘Russian World’. 
56 This is discussed in more detail in part II section 1 presenting the narrative of Russian ex-
perts concerning the Belarusian government’s policy.
57 The way issues linked to Poland are presented also raises serious reservations. Poland at the 
very beginning of the display is presented on a par with Italy as a Fascist state responsible 
for destabilising the situation in Europe in the 1930s. Meanwhile, the entry of Soviet troops 
on 17 September 1939 to the Second Polish Republic is presented as only “protection of local 
Belarusians and Ukrainians.” It is also worth adding that a large Soviet flag is flying on the 
large museum building which occupies a prominent place in the city centre.
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The Belarusian government’s media policy is equally moderate and far from 
anti-Russian accents. The	government	in	Minsk,	even	though	it	is	sensitive	
to	the	Kremlin’s	information	policy,	counteract	it	in	a	limited	way,	usually	
in	cases	when	it	directly	criticises	Lukashenka	or	undermines	Belarus’s	
position	in	the	international	arena.	On the other hand, it can be said that the 
Belarusian government either does not understand or consciously disregards 
the threats posed by the omnipresence of the Russian media in Belarus’s infor-
mation space. President Lukashenka does not officially undermine the legiti-
macy of the concept of building a common information space of the Union State 
of Russia and Belarus. Furthermore, given its small organisational and financial 
potential, the government is unable to reduce the advantage the Russian media 
has as a supplier of pop culture products. All Russian TV channels with national 
coverage are available on	the	cable	TV	system	in	Belarus	(people	who	want	
to	have	a	satellite	dish	encounter	administrative	difficulties).	Belarus	re-
broadcasts	one	TV	channel	in	Russia,	Belarus24.	This	situation	is	used	by	
the	Russian	side,	which	is	constantly	building	up	its	information	assets.	
In	a	statement	made	for	the	national	television	in	May	2016,	Igor	Buzovsky,	
the	deputy	head	of	the	Belarusian	Presidential	Administration,	who	has	
already	been	quoted	here,	said	that	the	dominance	of	Russian	companies	
in	the	Belarusian	information	space	was	disturbing,	and	on	this	basis	he	
pointed	to	the	need	to	strengthen	the	potential	of	Belarusian	TV	produc-
tion.	On the other hand, almost at the same time, during the meeting of the 
Council of Ministers of the Union State of Russia and Belarus in Mogilev on 
12 May 2016, the Belarusian minister for information, Lilia Ananich, and her 
Russian counterpart approved an ‘Action plan for 2016–2020 for creating a com-
mon media space’. Among its reasons for signing this document, the Belarusian 
side mentioned the need to exchange information and to coordinate the fight 
against extremism in the Internet58. 
The future of the media space is still an open issue. A secret service special-
ised in controlling the Internet space, the Operational-Analytical Centre under 
the President of the Republic of Belarus, which is also the administrator of the 
‘.by’ domain, operates in Belarus. One of the main state ideologists, Usevalad 
58 See: http://naviny.by/rubrics/politic/2016/05/12/ic_news_112_474821/ During the meeting 
of the Belarusian minister for information, Lilia Ananich, and the general director of Rossi-
ya Segodnya agency on 7 April 2016 in Minsk, the Belarusian side emphasised that the in-
creasing presence of the Russian media proved that the epoch of information wars between 
the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation was over and that the two countries had 
become the focal point of information aggression observed in relations between the West 
and the East. 
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Yancheuski, is in charge of supervising the ‘Bynet’ and the development of the 
computerisation of the country. The government has interfered with Net content 
to a limited extent so far; no comprehensive blockings of websites for political 
reasons have been seen, and limited measures against people whose views are 
considered extremist have been taken. However, no such measures have been 
taken with regard to individuals representing pro-Russian views; the repres-
sions have affected the circles promoting pro-Western and anti-regime views. 
The portals criticising the regime have also been hacked or blocked. 
2. The illusion of safety – belarus’s attempts to counteract 
and block the activity of Russian soft power
The Belarusian government noticed the threat posed by the intensifying activ-
ity (in the context of the developments in Ukraine) of Russian and pro-Russian 
organisations in Belarus quite early. Alyaksandr Lukashenka, answering ques-
tions asked by Belarusian MPs59 on 22 April 2014, firmly criticised the “idiots” 
who “create tension in our country” and “suggest that the Russian language is 
allegedly discriminated against”. He branded such statements as “criminal” 
and ordered the KGB “to treat such people as saboteurs”. At the same time, he 
expressed his surprise that one of the most active critics of the Belarusian gov-
ernment “has still not been banished from the country”60. However, observa-
tions of the operation of these organisations in Belarus over the past few years 
do not indicate that Lukashenka’s decisions have been fully carried out. The	Be-
larusian	apparatus	of	repression,	so	experienced	and	effective	in	dealing	
with	the	pro-democratic	opposition	financed	by	the	West,	is	surprisingly	
passive	with	regard	to	organisations	propagating	the	‘Russian	World’.	No	
event	held	by	any	of	these	entities	has	been	banned	or	obstructed	by	the	
government	to	date.	Members	of	these	organisations,	unlike	activists	of	
Belarusian	democratic	forces	and	the	third	sector,	have	not	encountered	
violence	or	arrests,	not	to	mention	court	trials61.	Rare manifestations of firm 
actions have affected only selected individuals who are especially active either 
59 In the Belarusian authoritarian regime, questions addressed by MPs to the head of state 
are in principle a stage-managed imitation of public ‘dialogue’ and for this reason they are 
asked according to a previously agreed scenario. 
60 See: http://naviny.by/rubrics/society/2014/04/22/ic_news_116_435065/; http://nn.by/?c-
=ar&i=127176 &lang=ru Independent Belarusian experts and publicists agree that this con-
cerned Viktor Gerashchenko, whose activity has been described in part III, section 3. 
61 The last time Belarus saw a massive wave of repressions against organisations propagating 
the pro-Russian idea was in 1999, when measures were taken against the neo-Nazi para-
military movement named Russian National Unity (Russian abbreviation RNE). 
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as publicists (revoking Kirill Averyanov’s Belarusian citizenship) or as social 
activists (the dismissal of Viktor Gerashchenko)62. However, it needs to be noted 
that even these single acts of repression did not affect ethnic Russians63 and did 
not end in the incarceration of these individuals, which is often the case with 
pro-Western critics of the regime. 
Channelling	the	activity	of	individual	organisations	by	introducing	indi-
viduals	totally	loyal	to	the	regime	into	their	management	structures	is	an-
other	measure	that	is	worth	noting	in	which	the	Belarusian	government	
attempts	to	take	control	of	Russian	soft	power.	One	example	of	such	moves	
is	the	case	of	the	Belarusian	Cossacks;	its	present	leader	(i.e.	chief	ataman)	
is	Mikalai	Ulakhovich	(a	‘rival’	of	Alyaksandr	Lukashenka	in	the	presi-
dential	election	last	year),	who	has	the	reputation	of	being	a	man	totally	
controlled	by	the	government.	As mentioned before, the central command 
of this organisation has little influence on its local branches, so it is difficult to 
say if this method is effective (at least in this case). At the same time, there is no 
sufficient information that would allow the scope of these moves to be precisely 
determined. Some of them are most likely made on the level of the operational 
work of the Belarusian secret services. It can only be assumed that the Belaru-
sian government at least monitors the activity of pro-Russian structures in its 
territory relatively effectively. However, there is no doubt that, in contrast to 
the effective, consistent and firm repressions applied to pro-Western organisa-
tions, the measures taken by the Belarusian security apparatus with regard to 
the propagators of the ‘Russian World’ have been indecisive and cautious, and 
have been used on a very limited scale. This has been happening regardless of 
Lukashenka’s clear stance expressed, for example, in the statement quoted at 
the beginning of this section. This means that the Belarusian leader demon-
strates resolve as regards this issue only on the level of rhetoric, while in fact 
his policy is slightly more cautious. This may be caused by at least three factors: 
Firstly,	even	though	the	Belarusian	government	understands	the	threat	
posed	by	the	increasing	presence	of	the	‘Russian	World’,	it	fears	that	a	wave	
of	repressions	against	pro-Russian	organisations	will	drastically	worsen	
its	relations	with	Russia,	thus	provoking	it	to	make	aggressive	moves.	
62 Both of these aspects have been described in parts II and III of this report. 
63 With the sole exception of the Russian political analyst Andrey Suzdaltsev, who had his Be-
larusian residence permit revoked and was deported from Belarus due to “posing a threat 
to national security” in March 2006. Suzdaltsev was a well-known public critic of the Bela-
rusian government’s policy, especially in the context of Russian-Belarusian integration. 
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Secondly, the mechanisms, procedures and operational habits of the Belaru-
sian security apparatus, which have developed over many years, cover basically 
only the structures which are pro-European and pro-democratically oriented 
and financed by the West. Minsk is unable to counteract the operation of pro-
Russian structures in a way that would not negate its alliance with Russia, the 
idea of the integration of the two nations and of belonging to the same cultural 
and civilisational circle. This gives rise to another limitation: the	Belarusian	
government	does	not	want	to	and,	at	the	same	time,	is	objectively	unable	
to	strengthen	the	natural	counterbalance	to	Russian	soft	power,	i.e.	the	
Belarusian	right-wing	and	national	organisations.	This	would	mean	that	
Alyaksandr	Lukashenka	would	have	to	open	genuine	dialogue	with	the	
Belarusian	opposition	who	call	into	question	the	legal	grounds	of	his	pow-
er.	A	move	of	this	kind	in	the	regime’s	domestic	policy	would	be	too	radical	
and	difficult	to	control.	
Thirdly, the government is uncertain about the loyalty of the elites. It	seems	
that,	given	the	long	tradition	of	being	part	of	a	common	state	governed	by	
Russia	(the	Russian	Empire	and	then	the	USSR),	the	integration	process	of	
the	two	countries	underway	since	the	mid-1990s,	strong	bonds	as	political	
allies	and	in	the	economic	and	military	sense,	and	the	cultural	proximity	
(which	is,	however,	far	from	indistinguishability),	it	is	extremely	difficult	
to	separate	‘us’	from	‘them’.	The examples of the engagement of representa-
tives of local administration and law enforcement agencies in the activity of 
pro-Russian organisations given in the previous sections are most likely a small 
fragment of the real picture of the situation. This problem is not limited only 
to the eastern districts of Belarus, but also to its two western districts: Grodno 
and Brest. In the case of Brest Oblast, other important factors are the fact that 
national identity is developed here to a lesser extent than in other parts of the 
country due to the strong presence of Polesia ‘indigeneity’, i.e. local identifica-
tion on the frontier with Ukraine, and a large share of retired military officers 
and their families among the local population who are far from the Belarusian 
national idea.
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v. aN allY OUT Of NECESSITY? THE aTTITUDE 
Of THE bElaRUSIaN nomenklatuRa aND laW 
ENfORCEMENT agENCIES TO RUSSIa 
One characteristic of Belarusian political life is that the president holds a mo-
nopoly on the official attitude towards Russia. His public statements are treated 
by representatives of the nomenklatura, state administration workers and state-
controlled media outlets as the current interpretation of the state of bilateral 
relations with Russia. Opinions emphasising Belarus’s loyalty to its ally prevail. 
However, statements criticising Russia can sometimes be heard, as well. These 
are usually made in response to current political developments or the condition 
of economic negotiations. Sometimes they are also expressions of the presi-
dent’s emotions, when he feels offended by criticism from Russian politicians. 
This	double	speak	towards	Russia	results	from	Lukashenka’s	principled	
approach	to	the	issue	of	Belarus’s	sovereignty.	He	understands	it	as	in-
dependence	in	domestic	policy	and	autonomy	as	Russia’s	partner	in	the	
international	arena	where	he	has	no	obligation	to	unconditionally	sup-
port	all	the	goals	of	Russian	foreign	policy.	Determining the scope of this 
autonomy has been a constant element of the current political game with Russia, 
and also a manifestation of Minsk’s fear of possible external interference with 
its domestic affairs. At the same time, Lukashenka represents a simplified ap-
proach to the ‘Russian World’ notion, treating it as merely a manifestation of the 
nationalist views of a section of the Russian elite who want to deprive Belarus of 
its status of an independent state or to cause its federalisation. In this context, it 
is worth quoting Lukashenka’s interview for CNN on 31 March 2015. He said in 
the interview that many Russian politicians think in imperial terms and want 
to deprive Belarus of its independence. However, he, emphasised that President 
Putin had never come up with the proposal of incorporating Belarus into Rus-
sia, knowing that this would provoke strong resistance from the government 
in Minsk. Meanwhile, the ‘Russian World’, as the Russian government under-
stands it, is an ideological concept and a long-term political strategy aimed at 
unifying all those who speak Russian and who see Russian culture as appealing 
and for whom Russia is the cultural and civilisational centre.
The	Russian	activity	in	this	area	shapes	the	views	of	the	Belarusian	no-
menklatura. It	strengthens	their	conviction	that	there	is	no	alternative	
geopolitical	choice	as	regards	both	security	policy	and	economic	relations.	
This also strengthens the belief that were Moscow to meet with strong defiance, 
the present shape of Belarusian sovereignty will be challenged. If this situa-
tion continues, the greater part of the Belarusian elite will become even more 
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passive, and if there is a possible serious political crisis, this will make it easier 
for Russia to influence the political scene in Belarus. 
The periodical volatility and Minsk’s nuance-based perception of relations with 
Moscow, however, do not result in durable revisions of Belarus’s strategic choice. 
The Belarusian government unfailingly declares its support for the integration 
initiatives being implemented under Moscow’s patronage in the Eurasian space, 
maintaining its strategic military alliance with Russia and positioning Bela-
rus as a guarantor of Russian security. President Lukashenka simultaneously 
makes assurances that he is a staunch supporter of strengthening the Union 
State of Belarus and Russia, acknowledging that this formula allows Belarus to 
maintain the position of Russia’s equal partner. 
Loyalty	of	the	Belarusian	armed	forces	and	law	enforcement	agencies	to	
the	president	is	one	of	the	key	guarantors	of	stability	of	the	country’s	po-
litical	system.	For	this	reason,	the	fact	that	these	structures	are	receptive	
to	influence	from	Russia	is	a	challenge	to	the	Belarusian	government.	The 
fulfilment of bilateral commitments linked to the emergence of the common 
security area with Russia has undermined the regime’s ability to completely 
independently shape the policy in this area. In the Belarusian reality this is lim-
ited to declaring concern about the increasing military presence of NATO and 
Russia close to Belarusian borders, and the lack of consent to the Russian plans 
to permanently deploy armed forces in Belarusian territory. This, however, does 
not affect the temporary presence of Russian armed forces in its territory as part 
of military exercises. Belarus’s military security is closely linked to the strate-
gic plans of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The Belarusian army, 
given the need to comply with the interoperability requirement, is organised 
on the basis of the Russian model. As a result, any plans of modernising it are 
closely linked to the Russian vision of using it in a possible military operation. 
One consequence of close co-operation with Russia is the intensifying process of 
indoctrination of the personnel of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus. 
The indoctrination work is based on inculcating the two paradigms: the Bela-
rusian army safeguards the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state 
and the constitutional order, and in alliance with Russia guarantees security 
of the Union State. 
The Belarusian government has given assurances that the Belarusian armed 
forces will only be used in the case of aggression against Belarus or Russia, thus 
emphasising the defensive dimension of the alliance with its eastern neighbour. 
The new Military Doctrine of the Republic of Belarus, which was signed on 
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20 July by President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, acknowledges the strategic role 
of military co-operation with Russia. New threats of ‘hybrid wars’ and ‘colour 
revolutions’ were added to it in response to the destabilisation of the situation in 
Ukraine, although it does not have a clearly anti-Russian character. One proof of 
this is the fact that the term ‘local war’ as well as other destabilising operations 
have been defined as actions organised by a foreign country with the intention 
to destabilise the present political system. The doctrine takes into account the 
possibility of using the armed forces of the Republic of Belarus when “other non-
military means have been unsuccessfully applied” to repel external aggression 
or to neutralise a military conflict of an internal character. The announcement 
that a military doctrine of the Union State will also be developed on the basis 
of the military doctrines of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation 
also proves that the two countries have a common approach to the catalogue 
of threats. The document has no clear anti-NATO or anti-EU nature–it recog-
nises the activity of military alliances as a threat to Belarusian security but 
also contains a declaration of its readiness to co-operate with NATO and the EU 
in the area of security in the region64. The official interpretation of the defence 
strategy of the Belarusian state has been supplemented by the vast analytical 
report published in August 2016 by the Centre for Strategic and Foreign Policy 
Studies entitled Belarus in the context of the rivalry between Russia and NATO65. The 
authors of this report in a much more direct manner point to the real security 
threats Belarus will face in case Russia continues its policy of confronting the 
West. They suggest, for example, that Russia, having deployed its troops along 
the eastern frontier of the Republic of Belarus, may use them also for military 
operations in Belarusian territory. Meanwhile, Moscow is placing more and 
more pressure on Minsk in an attempt to convince it to become more engaged 
in its military actions in the region. Lukashenka’s stance on military security 
issues has been presented, for example, in his speech at the National Assembly 
of the Republic of Belarus on 21 April 2016. He emphasised that Special Opera-
tions Forces and a territorial defence system had been established to counter-
act ‘hybrid wars’ and ‘colour revolutions’. He confirmed that Belarus’s defence 
system was part of the regional defence system of the Republic of Belarus and 
the Russian Federation in the western strategic direction, and that the Belaru-
sian government would strengthen its defence potential to make sure that the 
state was not defenceless in the case of a local armed conflict. This and similar 
statements from Lukashenka are often interpreted as an expression of his fear 
64 The text of the Military Doctrine of the Republic of Belarus: http://www.pravo.by/main.
aspx?guid=3871&p0=H11600412
65 For more information see: http://csfps.by/files/files/belarus-russia-nato.pdf
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of aggression from Russia and a warning that any interference with domestic 
affairs that may lead to a destabilisation of the situation in Belarus will meet 
with military resistance. 
The suggestions that Belarus will repel ‘Russian aggression’ are undermined by 
the practice of the operation of the Belarusian Armed Forces. The scenarios of 
military drills performed either jointly with Russian troops or by Belarusian 
troops alone are clearly anti-Western. This does not concern only the large ex-
ercises organised cyclically by Russia, such as Zapad, where the scenario envis-
ages a joint grouping of armed forces of the Russian Federation and the Republic 
of Belarus breaking a blockade of Kaliningrad. The routine drills performed two 
or three times a year by the Russian 76th Air Assault Division based in Pskov 
Oblast and the Belarusian 103rd Independent Airmobile Brigade from Vitebsk 
and the 38th Independent Airmobile Brigade from Brest also have an anti-West-
ern character. The most recent drill took place in April 2016 at a training ground 
near Brest. The subject of the drill is the neutralisation of alien armed forma-
tions wanting to take control of strategic targets (e.g. airports). Staff command 
exercises of the Belarusian territorial defence were held on 13-17 June 2016 near 
Grodno and Brest. Troops representing the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the 
State Committee of Border Troops, the KGB, the Ministry for Emergency Situa-
tions and the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus took part in the exercises. 
The scenario envisaged actions being conducted which are aimed at ensuring 
control of the frontier with Poland in ‘martial law’ conditions, and the liquida-
tion of saboteur and intelligence groups. 2,100 people took part in the exercises. 
A factor which makes it difficult to successfully curb the ideology affirming Rus-
sian imperialism is the weakness of educational work in militarised structures. 
It is based on the uncomplicated historical message which links the tradition of 
the Belarusian Armed Forces with the achievements of the Red Army66.
The situation is quite different in the case of the agencies in charge of state se-
curity (the National Security Committee, the Presidential Security Service, the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Analytical-Operational Centre, the Investiga-
tions Committee and the Financial Investigations Department of the State Con-
trol Committee). Officers, who are ethnic Russians or those openly representing 
66 The Belarusian Ministry of Defence returned to using the Russian terminology for naming 
combat units in August 2016. The term ‘mobile brigades’ has been replaced with ‘air assault 
brigades’. The Ministry of Defence said that the official reason for the change was the need 
to improve soldiers’ morale by making them aware of the fact that they serve in units whose 
combat traditions date back to Soviet times.
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pro-Russian views were dismissed under the president’s decision in 2005. No 
cases of dismissal of officers due to undercover collaboration with Russian state 
security agencies have been seen in these services. This, in addition to the staff-
ing policy based on the adequate selection of candidates for the service, is to 
a great extent an effect to reduce the scale of education of Belarusian officers 
in the education system of the Russian secret services. As a result, President 
Lukashenka was able to independently decide on domestic security policy. On 
the other hand, as with the Armed Forces, co-operation with Russian services 
has not weakened in what Russia views as top priority areas. This concerns 
the integration of the system of protecting the border with EU member states, 
combating organised crime, terrorism and drug smuggling, and intelligence 
co-operation against NATO. 
The ambivalent attitude demonstrated by state security agencies with regard 
to the operation of pro-Russian organisations in Belarus is still an open ques-
tion. Representatives of Russian soft power are tolerated, but their activity is 
not backed by the Belarusian government despite attempts to gain this sup-
port. It is certainly monitored, but no open moves to curb their activity have 
thus far been observed. The Russian direction is a kind of taboo for Belarusian 
services which act very moderately even in situations of confrontation and try 
to resolve disputed issues on the working level in consultation with their Rus-
sian partner. One example can be seen in the official reaction from Belarusian 
law enforcement agencies to the information received in late March 2016 that 
Russian nationalist organisations trained Belarusian young people at military 
camps in Russia. The Belarusian Ministry of Internal Affairs, despite the ex-
tremely critical reaction from the state-controlled media (which claimed that 
such activity posed a direct threat to national security), limited its action to 
issuing a statement that action would be taken to check whether any possible 
crimes had been committed67. Such behaviour may suggest that informal talks 
with the Russian counterpart have been launched to reduce the tension in bi-
lateral relations. 
The	conflict	in	Ukraine	made	it	clear	to	the	Belarusian	government	how	
easily	the	Russian	side	may	be	willing	to	start	destabilising	actions	in	the	
territory	of	another	state.	It	is	difficult	to	judge	how	likely	such	a	move	
is	in	the	case	of	Belarus.	However,	the	government	in	Minsk	is	certainly	
67 СБ: «Нацисты и фашисты не должны иметь доступа к белорусским детям», http://
udf.by/news/main_news/140603-sb-nacisty-i-fashisty-ne-dolzhny-imet-dostupa-
k-belorusskim-detyam.html
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concerned	about	the	possibility	of	such	a	scenario.	On 22 April 2016, the 
Lukashenka signed a law expanding criminal liability for propagating ex-
tremism and illegal participation in military operations in other countries 
(for example, forming an extremist organisation is punishable by three to 
seven years in prison, and participation in illegal armed formations outside 
the country is punishable by two to five years in prison). It is worth noting that 
the strictest penalties are envisaged for crimes linked to recruiting and train-
ing Belarusian citizens with the intention of using them in military opera-
tions in a different state, for which a custodial sentence of between five and ten 
years can be imposed68. Belarusian law enforcement agencies have announced 
that 138 Belarusian citizens participating in the fighting in Ukraine on both 
sides of the conflict have been identified and that criminal proceedings in 
absentia have been launched against them69. This proves that the government 
is concerned about the emergence of a group of Belarusian citizens who have 
combat experience and who might potentially be used in destabilising actions 
inside Belarus. 
68 О внесении дополнений и изменений в некоторые законы Республики Беларусь, 
http://www.pravo.by/ main.aspx?guid=12551&p0=H11600358&p1=1&p5=0
69 Фигурантами уголовных дел о наемничестве проходят 138 человек – КГБ Беларуси. 
Читать полностью: http://www.interfax.by/news/belarus/1208254 
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vI. RUSSIa IN THE bElaRUSIaN STaTE IDEOlOgY
Unlike with other post-Soviet countries, the structure of state agencies respon-
sible for ideological work with the public has been preserved in Belarus. The 
agency in charge of ideological work is the Main Ideology Directorate of the 
Presidential Administration of the Republic of Belarus. Since December 2013, 
it has been headed by Vsevolod Yanchevski, who is supervised by one of the 
deputy heads of the Presidential Administration of the Republic of Belarus, 
Igor Buzovsky (former head of the Belarusian Republican Youth Movement, 
BRSM). The results of sounding out public sentiment are useful for developing 
the guidelines of ideological work and the Information and Analytical Centre 
under the Presidential Administration of the Republic of Belarus (established 
in 2006 and is directed by Alexey Derbin) plays an important role in this pro-
cess. The methodological basis of ideological work is developed by the Academy 
of Public Administration under the aegis of the President of the Republic of 
Belarus led by Marat Zhilinsky. All the directors of the institutions in charge 
of ideological work issues are representatives of the generation of the nomen-
klatura who received higher education in Belarus after Lukashenka had come to 
power, and loyalty to the system is the only guarantee of career development. 
This has a direct influence on the content of the ideological message focused 
on supporting the president’s policy. They do not represent pro-Russian views 
and are focused on emphasising the independent role of the Belarusian state in 
shaping foreign policy. Ideological work is based mainly on speeches given by 
Lukashenka. The organisational form is a centralised structure of the agencies 
in charge of ideological work: specialised departments at state agencies and lo-
cal administration offices. 
The definition of the state ideology of the Republic of Belarus covers “the overall 
activity of the state apparatus led by the president aimed at ensuring favourable 
conditions for the development of the state, strengthen Belarusian statehood and 
consolidating the sense of national distinctness among the citizens of the Republic 
of Belarus”70. Important elements of the state ideology include building the his-
torical identity of Belarusians and highlighting their contribution to the develop-
ment of Central and Eastern Europe. Emphasising the weight of state sovereignty 
and the right to choose one’s own path of state development are the dominant 
elements of the message. According to the Programme for the Socio-Economic 
Development of the Republic of Belarus adopted on 17 June 2016, it is the task of the 
70 http://www.pac.by/dfiles/002324_960780_ir_gup_ochno.pdf
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government and the public to ensure political stability, economic efficiency and 
public welfare. Relations with Russia are taken into account only in the context of 
co-operation as part of the Union State as a mechanism of integration in the CIS 
area, without granting any particular status to bilateral relations. 
The issue of Russia appears to a limited extent in the narrative of Belarusian 
ideologists. Russia is described as a partner in integration processes and is not 
positioned as a state to which Belarus is unconditionally oriented. Nor is Russia 
the dominant factor in the historical context, either. The historical policy created 
by the government is based on taking historic facts into consideration selectively 
(references to the achievement of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Union of 
Lublin, being part of the Russian Empire, and the participation of Belarusians 
in the Great Patriotic War are present). It then uses this selection to support the 
thesis that the Belarusian nation has existed throughout the ages. However, this 
message does not contain a cultural context that would unambiguously connect 
Belarusians to the western or the eastern world—it declares tolerance for dif-
ferent religions, leaving the public on the crossroads of multicultural existence 
fastened by the brace of statehood. For this reason ‘Belarusianness’ is associated 
above all with identifying it with state sovereignty and emphasising that there is 
no alternative to the present political system. The president remains the central 
power, guaranteeing a peaceful development of the state71. 
It	is	noticeable	that	Belarusian	ideologists	appreciate	the	issue	of	the	Be-
larusian	language	and	cultural	distinctness.	The	deputy	head	of	the	Pres-
idential	Administration,	Igor	Buzovsky,	who	is	in	charge	of	ideological	
work,	has	emphasised	that	the	Belarusian	language	and	culture	are	“the	
insurance	policy	of	Belarusian	statehood”72. This positive signal has not yet 
caused a definite turn towards supporting the Belarusian language as a state-
building factor counterbalancing the Russian language. The government, up-
dating the state ideology concept on an ongoing basis, has chosen the formula 
of ‘soft Belarusisation’. In a desire to undermine the meaning of the symbols 
linked to the Russian historical narrative, the government have adapted them 
for their own needs. One example can be the replacement of the symbols used 
during the celebrations of the Victory Day on 9 May. The Russian orange-and-
black Ribbon of Saint George has been replaced with a similar green-and-red 
one, symbolising the official Belarusian national colours, and the ‘Immortal 
71 Владимир Мельник, Основы идеологии белорусского государства, Minsk 2012.
72 http://www.belta.by/culture/view/buzovskij-jazyk-kulturu-pismennost-mozhno-nazvat-
ohrannoj-gramotoj-belorusskoj-gosudarstvennosti-161570-2015/
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Regiment’ march held as tribute to veterans of the Great Patriotic War has been 
renamed ‘Belarus remembers’.	The	Belarusian	state	ideology	is	thus	not	anti-
Russian,	although,	as	shown	by	the	examples	presented	above,	it	is	making	
it	more	difficult	for	Russia	to	make	the	view	of	the	ethnic	and	cultural	
community	of	the	two	nations	entrenched.	
The weaknesses of the Belarusian state ideology include: the archaic bureaucra-
tised formula of the work of the state apparatus; rather unappealing forms of com-
municating information, reminiscent of Soviet times (for example, the formula 
of the meetings of lecturers from the ideological section with office and other 
workers); and its inconsistency resulting from the contradictory message. The 
idea of Belarusian sovereignty is being promoted, historical links with the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania are emphasised, and the fact that Belarus belongs to Europe is 
highlighted. However, it is difficult logically connect between these theses with 
the rhetoric of the dependence of state security on the strategic military alliance 
with Russia, Belarus’s economic development combined with Russian-style Eura-
sian integration and the periodical criticism of Western states’ policy (they are 
accused of carrying out plans to cause internal destabilisation in Belarus). At the 
same time, the Belarusian president contradicts himself in his typical way when 
referring to state ideology issues. He contradicted obvious facts in October 2014 
with his statement that there was no ideology in Belarus but there were people 
dealing with ideology. He narrowed down ideological work to work comparable to 
that of political commissioners who are tasked with working with the public and 
interpreting current political affairs73. During the same public address, without 
going into details he stated that it was necessary to develop an idea that would 
make the Belarusian nation distinct, that would not only emphasise patriotism 
and links with history but also, in particular, the participation of Belarusians in 
the Great Patriotic War and their desire to regain statehood74. 
The fact that the president formulates the key elements of the state ideology 
concept in an unclear manner results in the Belarusian ideological programme 
having an incoherent narrative. This is especially visible in the educational 
modules which present the interpretation of historical policy in the ideologi-
cal work guidelines developed by the Academy of Public Administration under 
73 It was determined on the grounds of the presidential decree of 16 June 2003 on the operation 
of information and propaganda groups that every third Thursday in the month is the day of 
informing the public on the basis of guidelines from the Belarusian Presidential Adminis-
tration.
74 https://regnum.ru/news/polit/1858051.html
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the aegis of the President of the Republic of Belarus. The topic ‘Concept of Be-
larusian statehood as a component of the national state ideology’ takes into 
consideration the following historical periods which had a decisive impact on 
the formation of the ‘independent Belarusian ethnic community’: the settle-
ment of Slavs between the 6th and 9th centuries; the shaping of the old Russian 
ethnos between the 10th and the 13th centuries; the formation of the Belarusian, 
Little Russian (Ukrainian) and Great Russian (Russian) communities between 
the 13th and the 16th centuries; the development of the Belarusian self-identity 
between the 17th and the 19th centuries, laying the foundations for the exist-
ence of the Belarusian nation and its right of self-determination as a nation 
and a state. The contribution of the Belarusian ethnos to building the history 
of Kievan Rus’, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (viewed as the progenitor of the 
Belarusian state), the Republic of Poland and the Russian Empire is also taken 
into account. The characteristic critical approach to the attempt to set up the 
Belarusian People’s Republic and the claim that the Belarusian Soviet Socialist 
Republic was the first real Belarusian national state are proof of the attachment 
to the Soviet historiography matrix. The collapse of the USSR is treated without 
a shade of resentment as an event which enabled the country’s independence 
to be strengthened, and at the same time the significance of the Union State of 
Belarus and Russia and the Eurasian Union project are emphasised since, acced-
ing to the authors of the ideological programme, these projects will strengthen 
the “socio-cultural identification of the Belarusian public in the face of ever 
stronger globalisation”75. Lukashenka’s attachment to the concept of building 
relations with Russia resulted in the development of the ideology of defend-
ing and strengthening the Union State of Belarus and Russia at the time of his 
meeting with the Russian president on 8 June 2016. This appeal should be seen 
in political terms – it was a reaction to the increasingly aggressive information 
campaign in the Russian media suggesting that the Belarusian government had 
embarked upon an anti-Russian policy and that nationalist sentiments had been 
increasing in Belarus. Lukashenka’s statement, offering Russia to take joint 
action to protect the ‘brotherly relations’ is his typical political gesture to calm 
down the Kremlin76. From the social perspective, Lukashenka’s appeal makes 
the dominant position of Russia as the only possible political and economic part-
ner entrenched in the mindset of the Belarusian public. 
75 http://www.pac.by/dfiles/002324_960780_ir_gup_ochno.pdf
76 Лукашенко: Союзное государство - самое продвинутое интеграционное объеди не-
ние на постсоветском пространстве. http://www.belta.by/president/view/luka shen ko 
-sojuz noe-gosudarstvo-samoe-prodvinutoe-integratsionnoe-objedinenie-na-post sovets-
kom- 196759-2016/
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vII. THE DEpENDENCE STEREOTYpE – RUSSIa’S plaCE 
IN THE MINDSET Of THE bElaRUSIaN pUblIC 
The long tradition of coexistence as part of one state managed by Russia along 
with cultural and linguistic proximity mean that the conviction of close bonds 
with Russia and Russians are deeply rooted in the minds of the Belarusian pub-
lic. Moscow	(and	for	some	time	Petersburg),	as	part	of	the	Russian	Empire	
or	the	Soviet	Union,	was	treated	by	Belarusians	as	the	centre	where	final	
strategic	decisions	were	made	and	as	a	synonym	of	the	‘better’	metropoli-
tan	culture	and	education	and,	consequently,	also	of	the	opportunities	
for	better	wages	and	career	development.	In	this	way	the	centuries-long	
subordination	to	the	stronger	neighbour	has	given	rise	to	a	kind	of	‘prov-
ince	complex’	among	Belarusians,	that	their	state	is	always	dependent	
and	therefore	not	quite	self-reliant.	The 25-year period of independence has 
brought about some changes in the mindset of Belarusians as regards their per-
ception both of themselves and their neighbours, including Russia. A sense of 
pride in having their own sovereign state has evidently emerged and strength-
ened, which is a natural process in the case of almost every post-Soviet republic. 
The stereotypical indicators of the distinctness (viewed as indicators of Belarus’s 
superiority) of the standards public life in Belarus and in Russia, which were 
popular in Soviet times, are now even more front-of-mind in people’s conscious-
ness. These indicators are above all: good roads, clean and well-tended cities and 
villages, lower levels of alcohol abuse, violence and immorality, a lower scale 
of corruption, the absence of mafia structures and oligarchs, etc. However, as 
proven by many years of research conducted by Belarusian independent soci-
ologists, Russia has almost always77 been placed first as regards the geopolitical 
preferences of citizens of Belarus, which proves that, despite the scepticism 
outlined above, the greater part of Belarusian society has maintained its pro-
Russian orientation. 
The	conflict	in	Ukraine	has	proven	that	the	sentiments	existing	among	
Belarusians	presented	above	are	durable	and	that	they	are	very	receptive	
to	the	message	from	the	Russian	media	which	can	now	be	recognised	as	the	
main	factor	forming	the	Belarusian	public’s	perception	of	Russian	policy	
77 There were sporadic periods when the number of supporters of integration with the EU 
significantly grew in the polls, as for example in 2010, when relations between Minsk and 
the West were still thawing, and simultaneously tension in contacts with the Kremlin was 
growing. At those times the change in the tone of the Belarusian government’s propaganda 
affected the geopolitical orientation of Belarusian people. However, these changes were 
short-lived. 
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in	the	region.	According to the most recent public opinion poll conducted in 
March by an independent Belarusian sociological research centre (these polls 
are conducted on a quarterly basis), 52.4% respondents would vote for unifi-
cation with Russia (understood as an enhancement of integration) while only 
24.8% would vote for integration with the EU. As	many	as	73.9%	of	them	be-
lieved	that	Russia	was	the	nation	whose	culture	was	closest	to	them,	and	
only	25.8%	indicated	nations	of	EU	member	states.	Nevertheless,	Belaru-
sians	are	a	little	more	sceptical	about	the	‘Russian	World’	idea,	as	only	
30.9%	of	respondents	expressed	support	for	this	concept,	while	as	many	
as	52.7%	of	them	said	that	this	issue	was	irrelevant.	
However, the answers to the questions directly concerning the developments 
in Ukraine provide the best illustration that helps understand the scale of the 
pro-Russian orientation among Belarusians. When asked about their opinion 
concerning the annexation of Crimea, 57.8% answered that this was an act 
of “restoring historical justice”. In turn, 51% of respondents believed that the 
Ukrainian government was to blame for the failure to implement the Minsk 
Accords, and only 20.8% said blamed the Russian government. On the other 
hand, it must be noted that most Belarusians strongly fear an escalation of ten-
sion in the Eastern European region. 45.4% expressed their concern that Bela-
rus might be forced to participate in a possible confrontation between Russia 
and the West. The deployment of Russian military bases in Belarusian territory 
met with even lower support (22%), while as many as 42.9% of respondents 
had a clear negative attitude to this78. Given this situation, Russian experts and 
publicists seem to fall some way short of the mark in their suggestions that anti-
Russian sentiments are allegedly intensifying in Belarus and that this is coupled 
with a Belarusisation and Europeanisation of the Belarusian public. In turn, 
the fears of the consequences of a conflict between the ‘great powers’, typical of 
the Belarusian mentality, can only strengthen pro-Russian sentiments, since 
Russia is still viewed as the only power capable of influencing the situation in 
the post-Soviet area. 
78 See: http://www.iiseps.org/?p=3960. A survey conducted by another independent socio-
logical research centre, NOVAK, led by Andrei Vardomatsky, revealed an even higher indi-
cator of pro-Russian orientation among Belarusians. According to poll results published in 
January 2016, almost 70% respondents said that the union with Russia was the best solution 
for Belarus. See: Andrei Vardomatsky, ‘Adaptation without borders. Full-year 2015 results’ 
[in: Belarus. Reality. Getting to the heart of the matter, 20 January 2016 issue], p. 3. 
58
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 1
1/
20
16
vIII. CONClUSIONS aND pOSSIblE DEvElOpMENTS 
1.	 None of the pro-Russian organisations operating in Belarus has attracted 
masses of members so far, and most of them are merely based on frame-
work structures consisting of up to a dozen or so activists, the maximum 
being several hundred. In some cases these structures do not even have 
their own office or any movable assets. The organisations propagating the 
‘Russian World’ are controlled and financed (via various channels and to 
a different extent) from one source and one centre of power—the Kremlin. 
Furthermore, their members are characterised by high discipline and ideo-
logical devotion (or at least the conviction that so-called Russian civilisa-
tion is superior) and the sense of representing the state which is dominant 
in the post-Soviet area. Therefore, these seemingly harmless and marginal 
pro-Russian organisations, if necessary – owing to intensified financing and 
support from the Russian media – may in a relatively short time increase 
the number of their members and take active measures in a direction that 
will serve Moscow’s current interests. 
2.	 The numerous publications by Russian experts and those Belarusian commen-
tators who share (or copy) their views, with their radical form and not quite 
adequate (and thus manipulative) content, are not reflected in the Kremlin’s 
official stance and are often (though not always) published on portals which 
have a marginal and extremist reputation. However, the striking similarity of 
the theses put forward in this text and of the narrative style prove that this is 
a consciously planned campaign coordinated by one centre, intended at creat-
ing a new concept of Russian policy towards Belarus. It needs to be emphasised 
that the present Russian narrative intentionally presents its own vision of 
reality in Belarus. The existence of anti-Russian sentiments among the Bela-
rusian public and the ‘Belarusisation’ policy allegedly adopted by the Belaru-
sian government have been intentionally exaggerated. A significant part (if 
not a majority) of these publications are financed from the Russian budget or 
by GONGOs. On top of that – and this seems to be the most important thing – 
the Russian narrative addressed to Belarus is already so well-developed that it 
may at any time be raised to the rank of Russian government propaganda and 
be used as an excuse for taking more or less assertive measures with regard 
to Minsk (from intensified pressure to a coup or military intervention). Their 
marginality is therefore only apparent. 
3.	 Everything suggests that the Belarusian government has not developed a coher-
ent strategy with regard to the ‘Russian World’ issue, and is still trying to find 
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its way in a situation which is new to it in many ways. Moreover, this is not only 
disorientation but also a growing sense of threat intensified by the inability to 
take firm action. One example of the Belarusian regime’s weakness in dealing 
with this challenge is the situation in the area of information. The Belarusian 
government is unable (and will be unable in the coming future) to break the 
dominance of the Russian message in the Belarusian media space. Were there 
to be a threat from Russia, the loyalty of the Belarusian nomenklatura is a key 
problem which, apparently, has not been solved. It appears that Alyaksandr 
Lukashenka and the section of his inner circle who are pro-state oriented are 
aware of the fact that, given the complicated and not quite clear background, 
any radical measures taken with regard to the ‘Russian World’ might lay bare 
the weakness of the Belarusian state apparatus (which is otherwise so effective 
and relatively united in dealing with the culturally alien Western influence) and 
lead to a candidate who is more loyal to Moscow taking power in the country. 
4.	 It is also unclear how the Belarusian public, most of whom declare a positive 
attitude to Russia, would react to a possible violent move from Moscow, es-
pecially considering the current situation of economic crisis and the result-
ing deterioration of living standards. It may turn out that pauperised and 
frustrated Belarusians will show indifference to independence, an abstract 
issue from the viewpoint of everyday life. 
5.	 As a consequence of all this, the Belarusian government has adopted a ‘wait 
and see’ tactic, typical of the Belarusian mentality. Minsk has assumed that 
the anti-Belarusian moves from Russian organisations and, in particular, 
the experts’ aggressive rhetoric has nothing in common with the decision-
making level, i.e. the Kremlin. Given this assumption, the ‘Russian World’ 
is not viewed as a threat to Belarus but only as a ‘voice in the discussion’ on 
the further civilisational development of countries in the post-Soviet area. 
Furthermore, it is often argued that there is no rational reason whatsoever 
for initiating a conflict by Moscow since this would mean “discarding the 
project of integrating the two countries in which Russia has invested so 
much over so many years.” Furthermore, some experts linked to the Belaru-
sian government even claim that the tactic of integration and alliance with 
Russia adopted by Minsk many years ago protects Belarus’s independence 
more effectively than in the case of Georgia or Ukraine, which chose a more 
independent and simultaneously pro-Western policy. 
6.	 In contacts with Western diplomats, experts and journalists, it is character-
istic of the stance that the Belarusian government currently adopts to avoid 
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the topic or downplay the issue of the Russian threat so as not to escalate 
tension and thus not provoke a situation where Belarus would become an 
object of rivalry between the EU, the USA and Russia. It seems that this is 
an effect of the fear that the destabilisation of the situation in the region, 
as was the case with Ukraine, may be repeated. The conflict in Ukraine is 
still the key psychological and also political factor affecting the behaviour 
not only of Belarusian elites but also the opposition and most of the public. 
7.	 The Belarusian government, wishing to avoid a situation of confrontation 
and conflict, on the one hand tries to maintain good relations with Russia 
and participates in any forms of co-operation as Russia’s ally. On the other 
hand, it cautiously emphasises Belarusian distinctness, which is aimed at 
building at least minimal but strong and clear distinctness as regards cul-
ture and identity. 
8.	 The Russian moves presented in this report are doubtless aimed at build-
ing an infrastructure of pro-Russian social organisations in Belarus and 
preserving its dominance in the media space. It is still an open question 
what the goals of these moves are. The most likely minimum goal seems to 
be maintaining control of the Belarusian government which, being aware 
of the strong presence of the ‘Russian World’ in its territory, should conduct 
a loyal policy as Russia’s ally while avoiding actions contrary to Moscow’s 
interests. In turn, should Minsk’s policy change leading, for example, to 
repressions being used against these structures, Russia may employ the 
instruments available to it to take more assertive measures ranging from 
a palace coup or initiating protests among selected social groups to a mili-
tary intervention. The ‘wait and see’ tactic adopted by the Belarusian gov-
ernment proves that the Russian strategy is effective. 
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